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COERCED INFORMANTS AND THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE POLICEINFORMANT RELATIONSHIP
Michael L. Rich*

INTRODUCTION

On May 7, 2008, Rachel Morningstar Hoffman, a twentythree-year-old Tallahassee resident and recent graduate of
Florida State University, disappeared while trying to
purchase 1500 pills of ecstasy, two-and-a-half ounces of
cocaine, and a handgun for $13,000 from two suspected drug
dealers.' Two days later, the Tallahassee Police Department
("TPD") arrested the dealers, Andrea Green and Deneilo
Bradshaw, who led police to Hoffman's body.2 Hoffman had
been shot and her body dumped in a rural area outside of the
3
city.

The swift apprehension of Bradshaw and Green might, at
first glance, appear to be an example of efficient police work.
But in fact, the TPD were intimately involved in the events
that led to her death, as Hoffman was a confidential
*Assistant Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.A., University of
Delaware; J.D., Stanford Law School. I am particularly indebted to Mark
Strasser, Dan Kobil, Steve Whetstone, Alex Kreit, and the participants in the
2008 Central States Law Schools Association Conference for their helpful
comments, as well as to Capital University Law School for the financial support
that made this piece possible.
1. In re Homicide of Rachel Morningstar Hoffman, Grand Jury
Presentment (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.tallahassee.com/legacy/grandjury.pdf [hereinafter Presentment]; Nic
Corbett, Woman's Body Found, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, May 10, 2008, at Al,
available at http://www.tallahassee.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080510/
NEWS011805100317/0/COMP.
2. Corbett, supra note 1.
3. Nic Corbett, Updated: Five Witnesses Testify Before Grand Jury About
Rachel Hoffman
Case, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT,
July
30,
2008,

http://tallahassee.com/article/20080730/BREAKINGNEWS/80730004/- 1/
hoffman0106.
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informant who set up the deal at the TPD's express direction
and under threat of criminal prosecution.4 Three weeks
before her death, the TPD searched Hoffman's apartment and
found approximately five ounces of marijuana, six ecstasy
pills, and other drug paraphernalia. 5 The next day, officers
met with Hoffman and gave her a choice: she could help the
TPD apprehend other drug dealers or face prosecution on
multiple felony charges. 6 The decision no doubt seemed
simple to Hoffman. The TPD told her that she only had to
provide "substantial assistance" or do "one big deal" to avoid
charges and promised that they would keep her safe.7 But if
she refused to cooperate, they threatened significant prison
time on multiple felony charges, and these new charges would
have made her ineligible for drug court disposition of earlier
marijuana possession charges.'
Given her options, she
9
agreed to cooperate with the TPD.
Hoffman's situation is typical of those faced by an
increasing number of civilians ° who assist police in exchange

4. Jennifer Portman, Friends Provide a Glimpse into Hoffman's Final
Night, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, July 13, 2008, at Al, available at
http://tallahassee.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080713/NEWS01/807130319
/0/COMP. Agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Florida Highway
Patrol also assisted in the attempted sting. Presentment, supra note 1, 2.
5. Rachel Hoffman Timetable, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Aug. 10, 2008,
available at http'//www.tallahassee.com/article/20080810/NEWS01808100328/
0/COMP. Ironically if not surprisingly, the TPD searched Hoffman's apartment
after receiving a tip from another confidential informant. Id.
6. Presentment, supra note 1, 1 1; Angeline J. Taylor & Nic Corbett,
Updated:Rachel Hoffman FacingMultiple Felony Charges when Agreed to Help
Police, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, May 9, 2008, http'J/tallahassee.com/article/

20080509/NEWS01/805090343.
7. Presentment, supra note 1,
1, 3; Portman, supra note 4.
8. Corbett, supra note 1; Julian Pecquet & Nic Corbett, Attorney General's
Office to Review Hoffman Death, Tallahassee Police Procedures, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, May 12, 2008, http'//www.tallahassee.com/article/20080512/
NEWS01/805120325.
9. Presentment, supra note 1, 1.
10. Law Enforcement Confidential Informant Practices: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security and the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary,110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Rep. Scott, Member, House
Comm. on the Judiciary) ("However, we cannot ignore the fact over the past two
decades law enforcement has made more drug arrests and turned more
defendants into informants than ever before. The war on drugs has pressured
law enforcement into using a great many informants with little internal control
over their officers and over vetting informants and their information.").
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She decided to cooperate alone, without an
for leniency."
She lacked a
opportunity to consult her attorney. 1 2
meaningful understanding of the charges she could face as a
result of the drugs found in her apartment,13 or what she had
to do in order to receive leniency.14 Once recruited, she risked
injury and death to cooperate with the government 5 and did
so with no training in conducting undercover police
operations or protecting herself from harm.'"
Hoffman's murder has become a flash point in the debate
over the use of confidential informants. 1 Local prosecutors
and the ACLU have questioned why the TPD did not notify
the State Attorney's Office about the drugs found during the
April search or Hoffman's agreement to cooperate, arguing
that the failure to do so vested too much unsupervised
discretion with the police.' 8 Hoffman's parents have filed suit
against the TPD, asserting negligence in the use of Rachel
11. Specific statistics on informant recruitment or use are unavailable
because prosecutors and police tightly guard the identity of their informants for
See STEPHEN L. MALLORY,
reasons of safety and continued utility.
INFORMANTS: DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT 73 (2000); Alexandra Natapoff,
Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
645, 654-57 (2008); infra Part I.C (setting forth the current model for the use of
informants like Rachel Hoffman).
12. Hoffman's Attorneys Release Statement Critical of the TPD,
TALLAHASSEE

DEMOCRAT,

May

10,

2008,

at

A6,

available

at

http://tallahassee.com/article/20080510/BREAKINGNEWS/80510006
[hereinafter Attorneys Release Statement].
13. It is unclear whether the police told Hoffman what specific charges she
would face if she opted not to cooperate. Compare id. (quoting a press release
issued by Hoffman's family, which noted lack of public knowledge of 'what
charges [Hoffman] was told she was facing"), with Taylor & Corbett, supra note
6 ("Hoffman was facing charges of possession of ecstasy with intent to sell,
possession of controlled substance with intent to sell, maintaining a drug house
and possession of drug paraphernalia."). Regardless, she received no legal
advice about the viability of any threatened charges or what sentence she
realistically might have faced if she had been prosecuted. See Attorneys Release
Statement, supra note 12.
14. See Presentment, supra note 1, 1 1.
15. See Corey Clark, Hoffman Case Spotlights C.Ls, TALLAHASSEE
at
available
Al,
at
2008,
20,
July
DEMOCRAT,
http'J/www.november.org/stayinfo/breakingO8IHoffmanCase.html (listing other
incidents where confidential informants were murdered).
16. See Attorneys Release Statement, supra note 12.
17. The unprecedented media attention lavished on Hoffman's case was no
doubt inspired at least in part by the fact that Hoffman, unlike many other
confidential informants in the drug arena, was a white, college-educated
woman. See Clark, supra note 15.
18. Pecquet & Corbett, supra note 8.
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Hoffman-a young woman with no experience in trafficking
firearms or cocaine-to purchase cocaine and a handgun, and
have criticized the TPD for not allowing her an opportunity to
consult an attorney. 19
A grand jury investigation of
Hoffman's death concluded that "negligent conduct on the
part of the Tallahassee Police Department and D.E.A.
[contributed to Ms. Hoffman's death."20
Meanwhile,
Professor Alexandra Natapoff contends that the Hoffman case
shows that police are not properly held accountable for their
use of confidential informants and that their use is not
sufficiently transparent. 2 '
These criticisms, however, miss the forest for the trees.
They focus on symptomatic flaws in the TPD's handling of
Hoffman while failing to appreciate a fundamental
constitutional violation inherent in the relationship between
the state and informants like Hoffman.2 2 By forcing Hoffman
19. Complaint $$ 32-33, Hoffman v. City of Tallahassee (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon
Cty. Dec. 30, 2008), available at http://www.tallahassee.com/assets/
pdf/CD1252031230.PDF; see also Attorneys Release Statement, supra note
12 (criticizing the TPD's handling of Hoffman and failure to allow her an
opportunity to consult with counsel).
In the months after her death,
Hoffman's parents pushed for legislative limits on the use of confidential
informants in Florida. See Jennifer Portman, Legislators, Law Enforcement
at Odds Over "Rachel's Law," Named for Confidential Informant
Rachel

Hoffman,

TALLAHASSEE

DEMOCRAT,

January

9,

2009,

http://tallahassee.com/article/20090109/CAPITOLNEWS/901090333/llhoffmanO
1. The Florida legislature eventually enacted a version of the law lacking
numerous provisions urged by Hoffman's family, including ones that would have
restricted the use of nonviolent offenders or those in substance abuse programs
as informants. Alex Leary, House Approves Bill to Protect Police Informers,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 28, 2009, at B6.
20. Presentment, supra note 1, at Conclusion; see also Clark, supra note 15
(quoting spokesperson for International Union of Police Associations, who noted
that "[o]ther officers around the country that see this story ... are going to see
what happened here and ask why").
21. Clark, supra note 15. Professor Natapoft's comments echoed those she
has raised elsewhere in a more academic context. See infra Part VI.
22. The rationale for these criticisms is readily apparent when the Hoffman
tragedy is viewed from the perspective of the constituency raising the issue. For
instance, prosecutors are concerned that when police recruit informants without
their input or supervision, the police usurp prosecutorial discretion and may
interfere with ongoing prosecutions. See Pecquet & Corbett, supra note 8.
Likewise, Hoffman's parents wish to be compensated for the loss of their
daughter and to prevent similar tragedies in the future. See Complaint, supra
note 19; Jennifer Portman, Hoffman Parents Call for Tougher Law,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 8, 2009, httpJ/www.tallahassee.com/article/
20090408/NEWS01J904080310. Nonetheless, likely because of their limited
perspectives, these stakeholders' critiques focus only on individual symptoms of
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to decide between working for the state and facing criminal
prosecution, the TPD compelled her to make a choice that, in
a practical and constitutional sense, was no choice at all. An
informant who agrees to cooperate when faced with such a
dilemma is subjected to a condition of involuntary servitude
prohibited by the express terms of the Thirteenth
Amendment.23
Since as early as the 1970s, commentators have argued
that the Thirteenth Amendment applies in the informant
However, the application of the Thirteenth
context.24
Amendment to the use of confidential informants should be
revisited for a number of reasons. First, in the intervening
decades, the Supreme Court has clarified the Amendment's
scope and Congress has passed broad enforcement legislation,
thus strengthening the legal argument for using the
Amendment to regulate the state-informant relationship.2 5
Second, scholars have begun to examine the use of informants
in more depth, raising practical, structural, and normative
concerns that the application of the Thirteenth Amendment
would specifically address. 26 Third, no one has adequately
the
dissonance
between
the
Thirteenth
addressed
Amendment's historical context and the modern use of
confidential informants; earlier discussions have instead
focused primarily on potential practical implications of
applying the Thirteenth Amendment to the relationship
between the state and confidential informants.2 7
Finally, the last thirty years have seen renewed interest
in exploring the Thirteenth Amendment's potential reach.28
Scholars have argued that the Amendment can protect,

the problem rather than the underlying malady.
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. Robert L. Misner & John H. Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A
Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1977); see also David
Katz, The ParadoxicalRole of Informers Within the Criminal Justice System: A
Unique Perspective, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 51, 68 n.104 (1981) (making the same
argument).
25. See infra Part II.C.
26. See infra Part VI.
27. See Misner & Clough, supra note 24, at 734-45.
28. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. REV. 124, 155-60 (1992) (contending that the
Thirteenth Amendment should take a more central role in the Supreme Court's
consideration of the scope of other constitutional protections, such as the First
Amendment freedom of speech).
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among others, children abused by their parents, 29 battered
women,30 prostitutes,3 ' bankruptcy debtors,32 women seeking
an abortion,33 and victims of sexual harassment,3 among
others.35 In response, critics have suggested that a careless
expansion of the Thirteenth Amendment could have
unintended and undesirable consequences, 36 and that such
expansion without consideration of the Amendment's history
and context, weakens the moral force of its blanket
prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude.37
In light of these concerns, this article asserts that the
Thirteenth Amendment constrains the state-informant
relationship, and provides legal, historical, and practical
support for this argument. Part I lays out a brief history of
informant use, defines the state-informant relationships
relevant to the Thirteenth Amendment analysis, and

29. See Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992).
30. See Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women,
Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
207 (1992).
31. See Catherine MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 13 (1993).
32. See Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165 (1990); Margaret
Howard, Bankruptcy Bondage, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 191 (2009).
33. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment
Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1990).
34. See Jennifer L. Con, Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment
Response, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 519 (1995).
35. See, e.g., Samantha C. Halem, Slaves to Fashion: A Thirteenth
Amendment Litigation Strategy to Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment Industry,
36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 397 (1999) (applying the Thirteenth Amendment to
garment workers in sweatshops); Aric K. Short, Slaves for Rent: Sexual
Harassmentin Housing as Involuntary Servitude, 86 NEB. L. REV. 838 (2008)
(extending Thirteenth Amendment to sexual harassment in housing).
36. Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1639, 1657 (1993) ("Following the lengthening shadows of constitutional
provisions as they recede ever further from the source is something to be
undertaken cautiously, with a constant regard to the consequences. No matter
how tempting or righteous the desired result may be, one must always be ready
to recognize when the reading has become too tenuous, the proposed doctrine
too vague, the implications too risky.").
37. See, e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth
Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1311, 1356 n.160 (2007) ("Overly creative interpretations of the
Amendment that pay little attention to its actual history and context can result
in cases and scholarship diminishing the Amendment rather than
strengthening it.").
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describes the current model for handling informants like
Rachel Hoffman. Part II discusses the original purposes of
the Thirteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court's
application of the Amendment in the involuntary servitude
context. Part III argues in favor of applying the Thirteenth
Amendment to the state-informant relationship and
addresses the most apparent legal and historical criticisms of
that application. Part IV sets forth a new model for the use of
informants that complies with the Thirteenth Amendment.
Part V discusses the Thirteenth Amendment's possible
impact on criminal investigation and prosecution in light of
this new model. Finally, Part VI explains how applying the
Thirteenth Amendment to the state-informant relationship
will address some of the societal concerns about confidential
informant use that have been raised by other scholars.
I. OVERVIEW OF INFORMANT USE

A. A Brief History
Private individuals have played an important role in
criminal law enforcement since Roman times, when citizens
known as delatores infiltrated subversive organizations and
prosecuted criminal offenses." Under English common law,
civilians played two distinct roles in law enforcement as
approvers and common informers.39
Approvers were
admitted felons who provided testimony against their
accomplices in exchange for a royal pardon; common
informers were private citizens who reported minor
regulatory violations in exchange for a portion of the assessed
fine.4 °
Both the approver and common informer systems
suffered from fundamental flaws. Because death was the fate
of both the unsuccessful approver and the convicted felon,

38. See ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS
IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 2-3 (2002); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims

Act and the English Eradicationof Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539,
566 (2000) (describing the use of private citizens as prosecutors in the Roman
Empire).
39. See Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision on Informants: A
History of Abuses and Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81,
152-53 (1994).
40. Id. at 153, 157.
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those charged with felonies had a strong incentive to become
approvers and accuse others, regardless of their guilt, in
hopes of obtaining a pardon.4 1 Moreover, law enforcement
officials could compel prisoners to become approvers and
accuse innocent civilians, whom the officials could then extort
for ransom.42 Meanwhile, a common informer could profit by
agreeing not to prosecute an offender in exchange for a fee
smaller than the potential fine, but larger than the informer's
share of that fine.4 3 These and other abuses caused both
systems to eventually fall into disfavor in England.'
Nonetheless, both carried on in some form during the early
days of the Union. Following the tradition of paying common
informers, the first Congress rewarded informants who
The approver
reported violations by customs officers.45
system continued into the nineteenth century through the
"general rule" that an accomplice who discloses his own guilt
and that of his accomplices would not be prosecuted.46
During the last century, these American remnants of the
common informer and approver systems have met vastly
different fates. Despite its early popularity, the common
informer system atrophied, and the rewarding of private
citizens for reporting civil regulatory violations has become
By contrast, the tradition of
largely anachronistic.4 7
rewarding those who turn in their accomplices has blossomed
into the modern informant system. Informants are now
involved in at least a significant minority of criminal
prosecutions and are a valuable tool in almost every area of
law enforcement.'
Specifically, they are viewed as

41.
42.
43.
44.

BLOOM, supra note 38, at 5.
Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 156.
Id. at 159-60.
See BLOOM, supra note 38, at 5-6; Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 155-

66.
45. Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 166.
46. See Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 595 (1878).
47. The one exception is the civil False Claims Act, which continues to
flourish. See generally Michael Rich, ProsecutorialIndiscretion: Encouraging
the Department of Justice to Rein in Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation under
the Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2008) (discussing the False
Claims Act and the limited number of other federal qui tam statutes).
48. MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN C. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW

ENFORCEMENT 14 (2d ed. 1968) ("The fact is that the informer is valuable to the
police in practically every spectrum of crime."); Natapoff, supra note 11, at 65457 (providing some rough estimates of informant use).
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irreplaceable in two particular contexts: (1) the investigation
of organized criminal enterprises, which are generally
resistant to police infiltration; and (2) the investigation of
narcotics, prostitution, and other vice crimes, because inside
information is often necessary for police to learn about their
occurrence. 49 Nonetheless, it is impossible to ascertain the
frequency or efficacy of police reliance on informants,5 °
because their identities are closely guarded and their use is
essentially unregulated.5 1
B. Defining Classes of Informants
In its broadest sense, the term "informant" includes any
civilian who provides information to police,52 and
encompasses a number of familiar cultural tropes, including
jailhouse snitches, criminal accomplices, concerned citizens,

49. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 12 ("The short summary of the
stated value of the informer from the prosecution point of view is that he is
almost indispensable in narcotics cases. With this we agree . . ."); JAMES Q.
WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 76

(1978) ("[Without an informant, few cases can be made at all, and thus the
DEA can monitor its agents' performance by examining case output or
undercover buys . .

. .");

Susan S. Kuo, Official Indiscretions: Considering Sex

Bargains with Government Informants, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1649-50
(2005); Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 768-69 (2002);
Note, Informers in Federal Narcotics Prosecutions,2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
47, 49-51 (1966) [hereinafter Informers].
50. Natapoff, supra note 11, at 654-57; Informers, supra note 49, at 50-51.
51. Police interest in confidentiality stems from the desire to ensure the
informant's safety and continued utility and to protect the ability of the police to
continue to recruit informants, who are generally afraid of getting "burned," or
exposed, by the police. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 70-72; CHARLES
E. O'HARA & GREGORY L. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
191 (7th ed. 2003) (emphasizing that the identity of a confidential informant
"should not be disclosed unless absolutely necessary and then only to the proper
authorities").
52. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 31 ("All people who are sources
of information, generically, and in the broad sense of the term, could be referred
to as informers."); Steven Greer, Towards a Sociological Model of the Police
Informant, 46 BRIT. J. SOC. 509, 510 (1995) ("[P]olice informants include
everyone who provides the police information about any matter whatsoever,
however useful or useless this may be for crime prevention and detection."); see
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (8th ed. 2004) (defining informant as "[olne
who informs against another; esp. one who confidentially supplies information
to the police about a crime, sometimes in exchange for a reward or special
treatment"); cf MALLORY, supra note 11, at 7 (defining an informant as "[a]
person, directed by law enforcement, usually compensated, who furnishes
information regarding unlawful activity or performs tasks as specified by law
enforcement investigators").
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and innocent eyewitnesses. 53 Informants assist the police for
a variety of reasons.5 4 Some are promised leniency in their
punishment in a contemporaneous or future prosecution.5 5
Others, like Rachel Hoffman, are told that the government
will forgo a potential future prosecution entirely, in exchange
for their cooperation.5 6 Still others, typically those against
whom the police do not have evidence of other crimes to use
as leverage, are paid for their cooperation.5 7 Finally, some
informants are driven by less tangible motives such as
feelings of civic duty, enjoyment of the positive attention from
police, a desire for revenge, jealousy, or the hope of using the
police to eliminate criminal competitors.5 8
The heterogeneity of informants makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to discuss them in a meaningful way without
making distinctions within the class.59
Setting forth a
53. See MALLORY, supra note 11, at 6-7.
54. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 41-50; O'HARA & O'HARA, supra
note 51, at 190-91.
55. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987)
("No practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice
of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which
the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea bargain
that promises him a reduced sentence."); see, e.g., United States v. White, 549
F.3d 946, 947-48 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing individual arrested for possession
of cocaine undertakes controlled drug buy in exchange for reduced punishment);
United States v. Mason, 293 F.3d 826, 828-30 (5th Cir. 2002) (addressing an
informant who was granted immunity for narcotics charges in exchange for
cooperation with police).
56. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 121-22 (Maxwell Macmillan Intl 1994) (1966).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 672 (11th Cir. 1992)
(discussing the relevance of the fact that the informant was paid nearly
$450,000); United States v. Diaz, 876 F.2d 1344, 1348 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting
that a DEA informant paid $138,000 from 1982 to 1987); State v. Murchison,
541 N.W.2d 435, 441 (N.D. 1995) (noting that the informant was paid $1200
monthly, $200 weekly for expenses, seventy-five dollars for each person from
whom he bought drugs, $200 extra for each conviction, and given a motorcycle
and $1000 for a down-payment on a car); Kevin Coyne, Informer Appears at
Trial, but His Recordings Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at NJ1 (describing
terrorism case where FBI paid informant $238,000 for his cooperation).
58. O'HARA & O'HARA, supra note 51, at 190-91.
59. See, e.g., STEVEN GREER, SUPERGRASSES: A STUDY IN ANTI-TERRORIST
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 2-27 (1995) (describing informants

based on their relationships with the activities on which they inform and with
the police); WILSON, supra note 49, at 62 (attempting to distinguish among
informants based on their occupation, their motive for informing, and the length
of their relationship with law enforcement). Of course, certain issues, such as
credibility, arise with respect to any informants, but the analysis of even these
common issues will vary widely depending on the informant. For instance, the
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comprehensive taxonomy of informants is well beyond the
scope of this article, but defining two classes of informants
will be useful for the discussion herein.
The majority of the discussion will be limited to "active
informants," a group defined as those who not only share with
police information that they already possess, but also seek out
evidence at the behest of police or prosecutors. 60
The
assistance these informants provide can span from arranging
and participating in controlled drug buys, often while wearing
a wire, 6 ' to joining subversive organizations,6 2 introducing
undercover officers to narcotics dealers,' or engaging in
sexual relationships with potential targets.' This article will
focus on a sub-group of active informants, termed "coerced
credibility of a jailhouse informant who claims that his cellmate confessed to
him is highly suspect because he has strong motivation to fabricate the
confession out of whole cloth. See Emily Jane Dodds, I'll Make You a Deal: How
Repeat Informants Are Corruptingthe Criminal Justice System and What to Do
about It, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1063, 1084-85 (2008). On the other hand, the
innocent resident of a crime-ridden neighborhood is likely to be quite credible,
because she may face threats of physical danger simply for assisting the police.
See Jacob Honigman, Can't Stop Snitchin" Criminalizingthe Threats Made in
"Stop Snitching" Media Under the True Threats Exception to the First
Amendment, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 207, 209-10 (2009).
60. See JOHN MADINGER, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT: LAW ENFORCEMENT'S
MOST VALUABLE TOOL 28-29 (2000). By way of example, Rachel Hoffman was
an active informant, because she sought out other dealers for the purposes of
setting up of a drug deal to satisfy her obligation of providing "substantial
assistance" to the TPD. On the other hand, a drug user who, after being
arrested, receives leniency in exchange for telling the police who provided him
with his drugs is not an active informant.
61. HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 26, 63; see, e.g., State v. Wilson, 128
P.3d 968 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006) (discussing testimony of confidential informant
who purchased methamphetamines from defendant while wearing a wire);
Brooks v. State, 858 So. 2d 930 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (detailing evidence in drug
case obtained from a controlled drug buy by a confidential informant in
exchange for leniency, including audio tape of the deal); McCollum v. State, 582
N.E.2d 804 (Ind. 1991) (discussing court's decision hinging on evidence,
including an audiotape, of a controlled drug buy by a confidential informant
working in exchange for leniency).
62. See United States v. Amawi, 552 F. Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(addressing evidence provided by an informant who infiltrated alleged Muslim
terrorist organization to obtain evidence); Kuo, supra note 49, at 1661 n.93
(listing cases); Colin Moynihan, Activist Unmasks Himself as Federal Informant
in G.O.P. Convention Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at A14.
63. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 26; WILSON, supra note 49, at
62; Informers, supra note 49, at 47-48.
64. See Kuo, supra note 49, at 1653-59 (detailing claims that informants
were required to perform sexual acts as part of their cooperation with police and
prosecutors).
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informants," 65 against whom the government has, or claims to
have, evidence of criminal activity sufficient to sustain a
conviction, and who are motivated to assist the police by
threats of criminal prosecution or punishment stemming from
that evidence.
C. The CurrentModel for Interaction Between the State and
Informants
Informants are an eclectic group, and thus it is unfeasible
to attempt to describe herein every relationship between an
informant and the state. Nonetheless, the model set forth in
this part aggregates recommended practices from police
handbooks and anecdotal evidence derived from news reports,
scholarly publications, and other sources to provide a sense of
both the consistent themes running through the interactions
between state agents and informants, and the variety of those
interactions. While considering active informants as a whole,
the model focuses most specifically on the relationships
between state agents and coerced informants. The model first
discusses informant recruitment, then turns to issues that
arise in the handling of informants. It concludes by
considering how the relationship between an informant and
the state ends and what legal avenues may be available to an
informant who seeks redress for injuries suffered in the
course of his service.
1. Recruitment
Given the importance of informants in many areas of law
enforcement, police officers are encouraged to pursue all
available avenues to grow their informant networks.6 6 At the
state level, guidelines for determining whether a civilian is a

65. The term "coerced" is not used lightly in identifying this class of
informants and has been selected for want of a better label. No normative
judgment is intended by it, but the label is apt. These informants are
distinguished by the fact that they assist the state under the threat of state
criminal sanctions, and such threats fit the definition of criminal coercion. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (8th ed. 2004).
66. See CARMINE J. MOTTO & DALE L. JUNE, UNDERCOVER 13-14 (2d ed.

2000) ("Every contact an agent makes in the course of his regular duties, or may
learn about from others in his non-police-related activities, should be considered
as a candidate to be a source of information."). For a time, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation even established a quota of informants that each street agent
was required to meet. WILSON, supra note 49, at 75.
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good informant candidate are at best scattershot, and
generally involve little oversight." At the federal level, the
Department of Justice has established guidelines requiring
that a case agent consider seventeen factors to determine a
potential informant's suitability, including her age,
motivation, relationship with the target of the investigation,
reliability, and history of drug abuse.6
Though the
guidelines provide no direction as to how these factors should
be weighed or applied in making the ultimate suitability
determination, they do require a supervisor's approval of the
decision to recruit an informant.6 9 Nonetheless, even when
guidelines do exist, they often give way to the government's
constant need for more informants.70
While informants can come from any walk of life, officers
are encouraged to target those civilians who are engaged
in criminal activity, live or work in close proximity to
criminals or crime, or associate with criminals, because
they are most likely to possess useful information and
connections. 7 1 Among law-abiding citizens, professions that
place individuals in a position to interact with criminals
and surreptitiously obtain information, such as barbers,
bartenders, hotel clerks, postal workers, doormen, and
waiters, are considered to be excellent sources of useful
informants. 72
Non-criminals can be useful informants, but the
most productive, long-term informants tend to be
criminals themselves.7 3 Criminals rarely volunteer to become
67. See Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 134-36 n.321.

Indeed, the unsuitability of Rachel Hoffman to be an active informant was a
focus of some of the criticism of the TPD's handling of her case. Presentment,
supra note 1, 1 1.
68. See Department of Justice Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential
Informants,
January
8,
2001,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/
ciguidelines.htm; see also MALLORY, supra note 11, at 24-25 (suggesting
information that should be obtained prior to including informant in
investigation).
69. Department of Justice Guidelines, supra note 68.
70. Dan Eggen, FBI Agents Often Break Informant Rules; Study Finds
Confidentiality Breaches, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at A15 (reporting on
internal investigation of compliance with DOJ rules for handling confidential
informants that found violations in eighty-seven percent of cases); Informers,
supra note 49, at 55.
71. HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 40.
72. Id. at 31, 33-40; O'HARA & O'HARA, supra note 51, at 194.

73. WILSON, supra note 49, at 65-66.
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informants without any police encouragement, so efforts to
"flip" a suspected criminal typically begin immediately
following her arrest.74 A civilian's uncertainty about her
future is highest in the hours after being arrested, thus
making her most likely to agree to cooperate at that time."
One former officer who trains police in informant recruitment
recommends that "[aill individuals arrested should be
interviewed for becoming potential informants," because
"[ilnformants who have initiated significant cases or provided
information for an investigation have been known to be
developed following an arrest for a minor offense."76
In attempting to recruit a civilian as an informant, an
officer's immediate task is to determine what might motivate
her to assist the police and whether she is willing to take the
extra step of becoming an active informant. 7 Sometimes the
potential informant's motivation is clear; before providing any
assistance, she will explicitly demand some consideration
such as a specific sum of money, a portion of any recovered
goods, or leniency on a pending or potential criminal charge."
But when an individual does not make explicit demands, the
most powerful motivational tool available to the police or
prosecutor is the fear of criminal charges and a long prison
sentence.9 Potential informants are often reluctant to assist
the police for a variety of reasons, including societal pressures
against informing, a continuing sense of loyalty to criminal

74. Id. at 73 ("Efforts to flip a suspect begin almost with the moment of his
arrest."); MALLORY, supra note 11, at 21; see also SKOLNICK, supra note 56, at
121 (noting the value of arresting an individual in the development of that
person as an informant).
75. WILSON, supra note 49, at 73-74.

76. MALLORY, supra note 11, at 21; see also HARNEY & CROSS, supra note
48, at 80 ("Every person arrested or who comes to the attention of an officer in
connection with a criminal investigation should be considered a potential source
of information.").
77. MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 66, at 14 ("Always remember that an
informant has his own reason or motive for informing and it is imperative for
the agent to deduce exactly what that motive is."). "In working with the
informant before beginning a case, it must be learned how far the informant is
willing to go." Id. at 53.
78. See id. at 14-15; see also HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 41;
WILSON, supra note 49, at 65-66.
79. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 41-42; see also SKOLNICK, supra
note 56, at 121-22; WILSON, supra note 49, at 65-66 ("A major motive-most
investigators believe the major motive-of an informant is to obtain leniency on
a criminal charge ....
").
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associates, and fear of physical harm if the individual's
cooperation is discovered.8 0 Particularly in cases where the
individual's testimony at trial may be necessary, the fear of a
long prison sentence is often the only leverage sufficient to
outweigh these concerns."' Thus, while active informants
cooperate for a variety of reasons, most are coerced
informants who assist the police in exchange for promises of
82
leniency.
While the agreement to cooperate is superficially similar
to a plea agreement, it lacks the safeguards that attach to a
formal plea, including specificity, judicial review, and, in most
cases, the participation of defense counsel. 3 When promising
leniency, police are instructed to avoid making specific
promises about what amount of assistance will be sufficient to
earn leniency or exactly what form that leniency will take.'
As a result, the police frequently tell an informant only that
"substantial assistance" is expected of her,8 and promise
nothing more than to share the fact of the informant's
cooperation with the prosecutor or the court. 86 Additionally,
while a court must ensure that a defendant's waiver of his
constitutional rights is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
before a plea is valid, 7 the active informant agrees to
cooperate without judicial oversight of, acquiescence in, or
even awareness of the deal. Finally, the negotiation of the
80. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 40; WILSON, supra note 49, at

68-72.
81. WILSON, supra note 49, at 72.
82. SKOLNICK, supra note 56, at 112 ("To maintain an informant network,
police must pay off each informer, usually by arranging for a reduction of
charge or sentence or by not acting as a complainant.. . ."); see also Informers,
supra note 49, at 54 ("[In the vast majority of cases, a person under arrest
for a narcotics violation agrees to become an informer to reduce his
punishment....").
83. Natapoff, supra note 11, at 664-68. Professor Natapoff also discusses
other protections inherent in a plea agreement that are not available to the
active informant, including completeness, finality, and enforceability. Id. See
infra Part V.B for a discussion of these issues.
84. Natapoff, supra note 11, at 652; Informers, supra note 49, at 56 n.49.
Vagueness is preferred because police typically do not have the power to keep
specific promises of leniency, and an officer must maintain a reputation for
honesty and fair dealing in order to continue to recruit informants successfully.
HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 62; WILSON, supra note 49, at 68.

85. See Presentment, supra note 1, 1.
86. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 62; MOTMO & JUNE, supra note

66, at 42.
87. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
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cooperation agreement often occurs outside the presence and
without the knowledge of the informant's attorney.'
The importance of fear in an active informant's decision
to cooperate, coupled with the lack of oversight of the
recruitment process, permits and even encourages the police
to engage in ethically questionable tactics. Shortly after an
arrest, police maximize the arrestee's fear of a long sentence
by emphasizing the maximum penalties for the crimes with
which she might be charged and suggesting that the only
easy way out is for her to cooperate. 89 And because many
criminal defense attorneys will discourage their clients from
becoming informants,9 " police make arrests at night, when
defense counsel are least likely to be available,91 or
discourage arrestees from contacting their attorneys. 92 At
least one expert suggests that even when there is insufficient
evidence to bring charges against an individual, police should
claim that charges will soon be filed to encourage an arrestee
to assist the police.9 3
Alternatively, he suggests filing
88. Natapoff, supra note 11, at 648 ("In its most extreme form, bareknuckled negotiations between suspect and agent take place unsupervised and
unrecorded, without judicial or public review or even the presence of counsel.").
89. WILSON, supra note 49, at 73; see also Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral
Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America's "Wars" on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1155 (2009) (discussing the use of threats of adult
criminal charges to compel cooperation from juvenile arrestees).
90. See Corbett, supra note 1 (reporting that Hoffman's defense attorney
'advises clients not to become informants because of the risks"); Daniel C.
Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 69, 111-26 (1995) (discussing
the pressures on defense attorneys to counsel against cooperation).
91. WILSON, supra note 49, at 73-74 ("[The arrestees] were allowed to
telephone a friend or attorney, but, as the arrest was made at night, there was
little chance of seeing an attorney before morning .... [Their attorney] was
cooperative, but after a day or so of negotiating.., it became clear that no deal
was going to be made. The agents were disappointed, since they wanted the
source more than they wanted the importers, but not surprised: 'You either flip
'em right away, or you don't flip 'em at all.' ").
92. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 362 (1981) (addressing the
propriety of DEA agents, aware that defendant had retained counsel, who spoke
to defendant without counsel present, disparaging defense attorney and
threatening stiff jail term if she did not cooperate); Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329
F.3d 912, 914-15 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that plaintiff alleged that police
discouraged her from consulting an attorney, "telling her that they were 'the
attorneys'"); People v. Mason, 97 Misc. 2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (dismissing
criminal charges in part because prosecutors and police repeatedly violated
court order by speaking to defendant outside of presence of defense counsel and
disparaging defense counsel's abilities in order to recruit defendant as
confidential informant).
93. MALLORY, supra note 11, at 23.
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criminal charges against uncooperative individuals for the
sole purpose of encouraging them to become informants. 9
2. Handling
After an active informant is recruited, her handler
instructs her on what is required to satisfy her obligations to
the police, which may involve obtaining evidence against a
specific target95 or simply "making cases" against others. 96
Once the active informant has her instructions, her handler
typically leaves her to her own devices so long as she
continues to be productive.9 7 The police become more actively
involved only when the informant undertakes a controlled
buy or other planned operation, during which they typically
will watch the informant as closely as possible and search her
before and after the operation. 98 These precautions allow the
police to protect the informant, enhance the admissibility at
trial of any evidence obtained, and confirm the informant's
candor and credibility.99
In some cases, an informant's handler will overlook
additional crimes committed by the informant. 10 0 The police
94. Id.
95. See Alexander, 329 F.3d at 914-15 (alleging that police recruited
informant based on her prior sexual relationship with specific target of
corruption investigation).
96. See Informers, supra note 49, at 48.
97. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 78 (noting an informant is "not
under police discipline or control, but is essentially a free agent"); Morro &
JUNE, supra note 66, at 60; Informants, supra note 49, at 48 ("[The informant) is
left on his own and, depending upon his success at making cases, he is allowed
to stay out on the street. The agent with whom he works periodically checks up
on him."). But see MALLORY, supra note 11, at 59-60 ("Control [of the
informant] can be maximized if informants are aware of or believe that they are
being observed by their control agents during period of inactivity.").
98. See MOTO & JUNE, supra note 66, at 53 (describing the process
required to guarantee useful evidence).
99. Katz, supra note 24, at 54.
100. Police handbooks on informant use emphasize that informants should
not be permitted to engage in other criminal activity without punishment. See
MOTTO & JUNE, supra note 66, at 55 ("Police officers should exert every effort to
make it clear to the informant that he has no right to violate the law because he
is working with the police, and violations will not be tolerated."). For example,
former narcotics investigators Malachi L. Harney and John C. Cross express
horror at the notion that addict informants might be permitted to keep some of
the drugs they purchase. HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 9 ("Furnishing
drugs to an addict as described would constitute a felony!"). Nonetheless, those
same handbooks acknowledge that police do ignore informant criminal activity,
see MorrO & JUNE, supra note 66, at 55 ("[Allowing informants to violate the
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are particularly likely to be lenient when an informant
commits a crime outside of the handler's purview.
For
instance, burglary detectives are more likely to overlook an
informant's commission of a drug-related offense, and vice
versa.'10 In some cases, a prosecutor may help an informant
avoid prosecution following an arrest by another agency.102
An informant may find herself in a continuous cycle of service
if, during the course of working off one charge, she is arrested
anew, and the new arrest provides the police 3with additional
0
leverage to require her continued assistance.
The fact that the informant is helping the police puts her
in danger of serious physical harm or death should her
criminal cohorts discover her perceived betrayal.' °4 In part
because of this risk, the police or prosecutor will sometimes
forego pursuing criminal charges against a third party in
order to protect the informant's identity.'0 This concern for
the informant, however, is not wholly altruistic. Police who
law] is a problem some police agencies have experienced. There are some police
officers, for example who will overlook informants' handling stolen property and
selling it at a profit."), and studies of real-life policing support that admission.
See Eggen, supra note 70 (noting FBI violations of Department of Justice
guidelines "including some in which informants allegedly engaged in illegal
activity without proper oversight or permission"); Zimmerman, supra note 39, at
136 n.322.
101. SKOLNICK, supra note 56, at 124-26.
102. Informers, supra note 49, at 58 ("Government officials admit that they
make an effort to get valued informers released from prosecution for nonnarcotics charges.").
103. See SKOLNICK, supra note 56, at 121 (describing how additional arrests
can "become[] an added value to the officer's bargaining position" and can be
used as a commodity to exchange for an informant's service).
104. HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 68; GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER:
POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 146 (1988); WILSON, supra note 49, at 70;

("The ultimate cost to the informant is, of course, being killed in reprisal for his
cooperation. DEA agents believe this is not a trivial possibility-one, in charge
of informant records at a DEA office, said 'three or four' informants in that
region had been killed in the preceding six months."); see, e.g., Scott McCabe,
Girlfriend of Accused Drug-Dealer Charged in Death of Informant, WASH.
EXAMINER, June 23, 2009, httpJ/www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/crime/
Girlfriend-of-accused-drug-dealer-charged-in-death-of-informant-48813992.html
(discussing how a woman enticed a DEA informant to location where her
boyfriend murdered him to keep him from testifying).
105. See SKOLNICK, supra note 56, at 129 (noting two cases where prosecutor
dropped charges to protect informants from harm); WILSON, supra note 49, at
68-69 (quoting supervisor of FBI organized crime squad, who stated that "we
will guarantee an informant's anonymity-we'll even throw away good cases to
protect him"); Alexandra Natapoff, DeregulatingGuilt: The Information Culture
of the CriminalSystem, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 1007 (2008).
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fail to protect the identity of their informants run the risk of
developing a reputation among criminals for "burning" them,
and thus becoming unable to recruit informants in the
future. 11 6 Despite the risks that informants face, most receive
little or no training. 0 7
3. Termination and Redress of Injuries
An active informant's cooperation with the police often
lasts for months or even years'08 and typically comes to an
end in one of four ways.' 9 First, the informant may change
her mind and refuse to cooperate any further.110 Second, the
state may terminate its relationship with an informant
because of misconduct, such as providing false information,
endangering officers, or repeated, unapproved lawbreaking."'
Third, the state may decide that the informant's cooperation
is no longer needed or that she has fulfilled her obligation to
assist the police. 112 Finally, the relationship will end if the
informant is severely injured or killed. 113
106. SKOLNICK, supra note 56, at 128-29; WILSON, supra note 49, at 71-72.
107. Even the lengthy guidelines set forth by the Department of Justice for
the use of confidential informants do not make any provisions for informant
training. See Department of Justice Guidelines, supra note 68. Pursuant
to TPD policy, Rachel Hoffman received no training prior to the drug deal
that led to her death. Brian Ross & Vic Walter, Botched Sting: Killed with
Gun She Was Supposed to Buy, ABC NEWS.COM, July 25, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Storyid=5450550; see also HARNEY & CROSS,
supra note 48, at 80 (noting that an informant "is not a trained investigative
officer").
108. See MALLORY, supra note 11, at 59 (noting that informants should be
evaluated by the police "at least quarterly"); WILSON, supra note 49, at 65-66
(noting that out of thirty-nine informants who had been working for a local DEA
office for more than two years, twenty were "working off a beef").
109. Despite extensive focus on the recruitment and handling of informants,
most of the police handbooks on the use of informants cited herein provide no
guidance on when an informant's service should be deemed complete.
110. MALLORY, supra note 11, at 37-39; Informers, supra note 49, at 48
("[The informant's] usefulness to the Government ends when-for whatever
reason-he stops making cases.").
111. MALLORY, supra note 11, at 39; see, e.g., Bonnie Hayes, Chad
MacDonald's Short, Tragic Life, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, at 1 (reporting that
police terminated cooperation agreement with informant after he was
apprehended engaging in an unapproved drug transaction).
112. See MALLORY, supra note 11, at 39; Informers, supra note 49, at 48
("The system rewards only the informer who successfully makes a 'sufficient'
number of cases.").
113. Rachel Hoffman's murder is but one example of an informant's
assistance ending because of violence resulting from her status as an informant.
See United States v. Dublin, 189 F. App'x 151 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding life
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An informant who decides to stop cooperating may be put
in jail to give her time to reconsider her decision.14 If the
informant remains unwilling to cooperate, or if the informant
is terminated for other misconduct, the state typically will
withhold the promised benefit."'
Moreover, because the
integrity of the police, with respect both to providing and to
withholding benefits, is of the utmost importance, the state
often will prosecute a reluctant informant to the fullest extent
possible to discourage
similar reticence
by
other
11 6
informants.
Conversely, where the relationship between the state and
the active informant ends acrimoniously, the informant may
file suit to force the state to provide the promised benefit.
While an informant may prevail in such a suit," 7 the openended nature of state-informant agreements often makes
success unlikely. Courts treat an agreement between an
informant and the state like any other contract, and thus, in
order to compel the state to provide the promised benefit, the
informant must first establish the terms of her arrangement18
and show that she carried out her end of the bargain."
Prosecutors, however, often retain full discretion to determine
whether an informant's assistance has been sufficient to
sentences on drug crimes for defendants who admitted killing confidential
informant); People v. Booker, 862 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div. 2008) (upholding
conviction in murder of confidential informant).
114. MALLORY, supra note 11, at 37, 39 ("The informant may decide to not
cooperate ....
Informants will often rethink their exposure and decide to not
cooperate if given too much time to contemplate their decision. However a night
or two in jail can work for the investigator to help the informant decide to
cooperate.").
115. Informers, supra note 49, at 56 ("Along with these promises, the Bureau
of Narcotics acquaints the informer with one pressing fact of life: if he does not
make sufficient cases, his own case will be pushed up on the trial court's
calendar and he is unlikely to get the benefit of a [more lenient charge].").
116. Id.; see, e.g., Stuart Pfeifer, Informant'sKin Can Sue Police, CourtRules,
L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2002, at B3 (reporting that after cooperation agreement
was terminated for unapproved criminal activity, police told informant that he
would be prosecuted on original charges).
117. See Bowers v. State, 500 N.E.2d 203 (Ind. 1986) (ordering dismissal of
case against defendant as a result of breach of cooperation agreement by
prosecutor on public policy grounds); People v. Jackson, 480 N.W.2d 283 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1991) (upholding dismissal of charges against informant who complied
with agreement to provide information relating to bank robbery in exchange for
immunity).
118. See State v. Morocco, 393 S.E.2d 545, 550-51 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990)
(rejecting defendant's evidence as insufficient to establish that he provided
substantial assistance).
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merit leniency, and courts generally are loath to impinge on
that discretion absent evidence that the state acted in bad
faith or with an unconstitutional motive. 119 Furthermore,
when the informant's testimony about the terms of the
agreement or about her performance conflicts with that of the
police, the relative social positions of the two witnesses
usually cause any credibility determination to be decided
against the informant.'2
Should harm befall the informant during the course of
her service, her options for redress are limited. She may
assert state-law tort claims against the individual officers or
the political subdivision for which she worked.121 Depending
on the jurisdiction, these claims may be successful, 122 or they
may be categorically barred by statutory limits on official
liability.'23 An injured informant may also file suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 asserting a violation of her Sixth Amendment

119. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (recognizing
that court could review prosecutor's decision not to file motion for downward
departure for unconstitutional motives, but requiring "substantial threshold
showing" before requiring evidentiary hearing); United States v. Villareal, 491
F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2007) (requiring government to decide whether defendant
provided substantial assistance, but noting that government's discretion in
making that determination is limited only by prohibition of unconstitutional
motives); United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1487 (2d Cir. 1992)
(requiring some evidence of bad faith by government before ordering hearing on
whether to compel government to move for downward departure).
120. See, e.g., Kegler v. United States, Civil Action No. 2:06-cv-00339, 2009
WL 1788634, at *8-15 (S.D. W. Va. June 19, 2009) (rejecting as not credible
defendant's claim that an agent promised the filing of a downward departure
motion based on substantial assistance); United States v. Zabare, No. 84 Cr. 158
(CSH), 1988 WL 3487, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1988) (crediting police testimony
on nature of agreement over testimony of defendant); Henry v. State, No. 40,
2007, 2007 WL 2254550, at *2 (Del. Aug. 7, 2007) (rejecting defendant's
contention that state had reneged on promise of leniency, noting that trial court
had credited officer's assertion that no promise was made).
121. See Complaint, supra note 19, TT 32-33 (alleging negligence by the City
of Tallahassee).
122. See, e.g., Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 641 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (upholding $1.1 million award under District's wrongful death statute for
death of confidential informant); Stuart Pfeifer, Slain Teen Informant's Kin
Settle for $1 Million, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 2002, at B1.
123. See Vaughn v. City of Athens, 176 Fed. App'x 974, 978-79 (11th Cir.
2006) (affirming dismissal of wrongful death claims on grounds that police were
shielded from liability while undertaking discretionary functions within scope of
law enforcement duties); Phillips v. Grady County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 92
Fed. App'x 692, 698 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding individual defendant immune from
suit under state tort claims act).
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right to counsel 1 24 or her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights. 125 Under current precedent,
these constitutional arguments are unlikely to succeed.
Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
attach until the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings, 126 active informants are not entitled to its
protections if, as is typical, they are recruited prior to charges
being filed. 127 Moreover, even after the right to counsel
attaches, no remedy is available for a Sixth Amendment
violation unless the informant can prove that the violation
prevented her from receiving a fair trial in the pending
criminal case.' 28 Given that active informants typically only
gather evidence against others of unrelated crimes,
establishing such prejudice is a tall order.
An injured informant may have more success in claiming
a substantive due process violation under the "special
29
relationship" and "state-created danger" doctrines.1
Pursuant to the former, a plaintiff argues that the
government had a duty to shield her from harm caused by
third-parties, because her relationship with the government
makes her less able to protect herself and the breach of that
duty violated her due process rights. 130
Alternately, a
124. See People v. Mason, 411 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
125. See Williamson v. City of Va. Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1251-55 (E.D.
Va. 1992) (granting summary judgment on claims that police violated decedent's
due process rights when recruitment as an informant led to suicide), affd 991
F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Daniel J. Moore, ProtectingAlien-Informants:
The State-Created Danger Theory, Plenary Power Doctrine, and International
Drug Cartels, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 295 (2007) (discussing the viability of
substantive due process arguments as a defense in deportation proceedings of
aliens who acted as government informants).
126. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-88 (1984).
127. See Natapoff, supra note 11, at 667.
128. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (reversing
dismissal of criminal charges). 'Cases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations
are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury
suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe
on competing interests." Id.
129. See Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 647-52 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (noting that substantive due process may have been violated where police
failed to protect police informant, but right to protection was not clearly
established and claims were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds); G-69 v.
Degnan, 745 F. Supp. 254, 262-65 (D.N.J. 1990) (discussing infringement on the
liberty interest where informant asserted viable due process claim based on
state's failure to relocate and provide new identity pursuant to agreement).
130. See Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The State-Created Danger
Doctrine, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165, 1169-71 (2005).
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plaintiff may contend that the government is liable for
injuries caused by a third-party because a culpable state actor
created the danger that resulted in the harm.'
An
informant's success with these arguments will vary
depending on the jurisdiction, because some circuits have
rejected substantive due process claims brought by
informants on the ground that informants voluntarily assume
any risks of cooperating with the police. 3 2 Even when such
claims are allowed to proceed, their viability is based on the
highly variable jury determination of whether the state action
"shocks the conscience." 133
131. See id. at 1171-75.
132. See Vaughn v. City of Athens, 176 Fed. App'x 974, 977-78 (11th Cir.
2006) (rejecting due process claims on grounds that police did not have duty to
protect informant while not in custody, despite knowledge of threats on
informant's life); Gatlin ex rel. Estate of Gatlin v. Green, 362 F.3d 1089, 109394 (8th Cir. 2004) ("By cooperating with police in exchange for a reduced
sentence and a chance to relocate, Gatlin knowingly assumed a considerable
risk that MC gang members would eventually discover his cooperation and seek
to avenge him."); Dykema v. Skoumal, 261 F.3d 701, 706-07 (7th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting substantive due process claim on grounds that decedent, a drug
dealer, "assumed the drug dealing risks"); see also McIntyre v. United States,
336 F. Supp. 2d 87, 113 (D. Mass. 2004) ("To be sure, because McIntyre was
suspected of criminal activity, his decision to cooperate might have been based
on persuasive argument by the government that it was in his interest to assist
the government's investigation and prosecution of the criminal activities of
others. It is also safe to say that confidential informants are generally more at
risk than persons who are not informants. But . . .McIntyre chose to be an
informant."). But see Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 906 (8th Cir.
2009) (discussing deportation action against former narcotics informant,
rejecting government's contention that informant assumed risk of death in
home country by engaging in drug trade and noting that "the violence RamirezPeyro faces, if anything, is an occupational hazard of working on behalf of the
U.S. government, and, surely, this is not the type of hazard that we would like
to encourage would-be informants to avoid for fear of it being used against them
when they seek protection").
133. For instance, in Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151 (2d Cir.
2008), the court found that the plaintiff satisfactorily established a "statecreated danger" when the New York Police Department planned a sting that
would disclose the plaintiffs status as a police informant. Id. at 157-58. The
Second Circuit nevertheless affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the
defendants, reasoning that the NYPD's actions did not shock the conscience,
because the sting required them to exercise professional judgment and balance
concerns about their own safety with that of the plaintiff. Id. at 158-59. The
court concluded, "[wie are loath to dictate to the police how best to protect
themselves and the public, especially when our ruling could be taken to require
officers to use riskier methods than their professional judgment demands." Id.
at 159. Given this deferential standard and considering the discretion and
judgment that must be exercised in every phase of informant management, it is
difficult to imagine many situations where an informant could establish a
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OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND ITS
APPLICATION

A. The Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment is striking for its
breadth and absolutism:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any
34
place subject to their jurisdiction. 1

Though the issue of whether the Thirteenth
Amendment's reach extends to prohibit the badges and
incidents of slavery has produced conflict among the Supreme
Court, Congress,
and scholars,135
the Amendment's
unequivocal ban on both the formal institution of slavery and
broader practices of involuntary servitude is unquestioned.
The Supreme Court has consistently and forcefully affirmed
that the Amendment is "an absolute declaration that slavery
or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States." 36 Moreover, unlike other Amendments that
restrain only the government, the Thirteenth Amendment
forbids slavery and involuntary servitude regardless of
whether it is state-mandated or the result of solely private
37
action. 1
substantive due process violation. But see Butera, 235 F.3d at 652-54 (finding
that informant may be able to establish conduct that shocks the conscience in
planning of undercover drug buy, but ultimately holding that officers were
entitled to qualified immunity because substantive due process right was not
clearly established).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
135. See generally Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the
FourteenthAmendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171 (1951) (criticizing Supreme Court's
narrow interpretation of Thirteenth Amendment in light of Congressional
debates on its passage); Alexander Tsesis, FurtheringAmerican Freedom: Civil
Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307 (2004) (contending
that the Thirteenth Amendment is a powerful tool for the enactment of civil
rights reforms, and sometimes a more preferable avenue for such reforms than
the Fourteenth Amendment).
136. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); see also City of Memphis v.
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968) (quoting Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 20).
137. See, e.g., tenBroek, supra note 135, at 172 (comparing the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments and noting that the former "operat[es] upon the
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In his seminal examination of the ratification debates,
Professor Jacobus tenBroek identified three goals that the
13 8
Thirteenth Amendment's supporters sought to achieve.
First, the Amendment abolished "[silavery in its narrowest
and strictest sense-slavery as legally enforceable personal
servitude." 39 Second, Congress sought to free all blacks, both
in the South and the North, from "the burdens, badges, and
indicia of slavery," and to "confirm the principle that 'nature
made all men free and entitled them to equal rights before
the law."" 4
Finally, Congress intended to abolish "the
incidents of [slavery] which impaired and destroyed the rights
of the whites."' 4 '

These "incidents" included violence

perpetrated against whites who opposed slavery, limits on the
speech and assembly rights of abolitionists, and the extreme
poverty and ignorance that were believed
to be collateral
142
effects of slavery on Southern whites.
The goals set forth by Congress echoed the "free labor"
ethos propounded by many abolitionists and, most notably,
Senator William H. Seward. To Seward and other free labor
43
abolitionists, "the nobility of labor was an article of faith."
Laborers who were able to pursue their calling and "to leave
their jobs and take others" were the foundation of the
Northern economy, which the abolitionists believed to be
inherently superior to the stagnant Southern plantation
economy. 144 Slavery was of course the antithesis of free labor,
and free labor abolitionists decried the institution itself, as
acts of the individuals whether sanctioned by state authority or not").
138. Id. at 179.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 179-80.
141. Id. at 180.
142. Id.; see CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864) (statement of
Cong. Ebon C. Ingersoll) ("I am in favor of the adoption of this amendment to
the Constitution for the sake of the seven millions of poor white people who live
in the slave States but who have ever been deprived of the blessings of manhood
by reason of this thrice-accursed institution of slavery. Slavery has kept them
in ignorance, in poverty, and in degradation. Abolish slavery, and school-houses
will rise upon the ruins of the slave mart, intelligence will take the place of
ignorance, wealth of poverty, and honor of degradation; industry will go hand in
hand with virtue, and prosperity with happiness, and a disinthralled and
regenerated people will rise up and bless you and be an honor to the American
Republic.").
143. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIvIL WAR 12 (2d ed. 1995).

144. Id. at 11-13, 26.

706

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:50

well as the cultural and economic foundation of the South
generally as immoral, politically unsound, socially pernicious,
and economically inferior. 4 5 They believed that the South's
dependence on slaves was doomed to fail because slaves
always would lack the desire for upward social mobility that
inspired free laborers. 146 Moreover, free labor abolitionists
argued that the use of slaves denigrated labor generally and
forced non-slaveholding Southern white laborers to endure
47
disdain and social stagnation. 1

Free labor's moral and social arguments found a voice
among
the
Thirteenth
Amendment's
Congressional
supporters, who contended that involuntary servitude of any
kind runs contrary to natural law principles that guarantee
all men certain unalienable rights. 148 These abolitionists
specifically pointed to two of the Amendment's philosophical
underpinnings: "First, the Lockean presuppositions about
natural rights and the protective functions of government;
second, slavery's denial of these rights and this protection not
149
only to blacks, bond and free, but to whites as well."
Among other "God-given rights," 5 ° the Amendment sought to
guarantee every man's natural right "'to till the soil, to earn
his bread by the sweat of his brow, and to enjoy the rewards
of his own labor.'""' By interfering with the natural right of
145. Id. at 40-43.
146. Id. at 45-46.
147. Id. at 46-48, 50.
148. tenBroek, supra note 135, at 178 (quoting the statement of Cong.
Godlove S. Orth, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 139 (1865)).
149. Id. at 176.
150. Supporters also wished to safeguard natural rights to life, education,
legally-protected familial relations, and the acquisition and ownership of
property. Id. at 180.
151. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (statement of
Cong. Ebon C. Ingersoll)); see CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200
(statement of Representative John F. Farnsworth) ("What vested rights so high
or so sacred as a man's right to himself, to his wife and children, to his liberty,
and to the fruits of his own industry? Did not our fathers declare that those
rights were inalienable? And if a man cannot himself alienate those rights, how
can another man alienate them without being himself a robber of the vested
rights of his brother-man?"). A desire to protect the natural rights of all
citizens, including the right to possess and enjoy property, a necessary corollary
to the right to benefit from one's own labor, also animated the efforts of the
principal drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment, Senator Lyman Trumbell and
Representative James F. Wilson, in their support of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 429, 459-60 (2004).
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slaves to reap the fruits of their labor,
the institution of
52
slavery devalued the work of all men. 1
B. Early Supreme Court Interpretationand the Peonage
Cases
Although the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment has never realized the expansive3
1
scope that was contemplated by its original supporters,
shortly after its ratification, the Court recognized that the
Amendment at least prohibits any condition of involuntary
servitude imposed on anyone anywhere in the United
States. M' Nevertheless, the first direct applications of the
Amendment by the lower federal courts came in response to
the so-called "Black Codes," and subsequent attempts by
Southern legislatures to recapture the inexpensive labor of
freed slaves and other blacks for the benefit of white
landowners. 15 Under the Black Codes, black males who did
not enter into employment contracts were charged as criminal
vagrants, those who quit jobs were arrested and returned to
their employers, and black children were "apprenticed"
against their will by order of probate courts. 156 Those
152. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1320 (statement of Sen.
Wilson) ("Slavery, hating the cherished institutions that tend to secure the
rights and enlarge the privileges of all mankind; despising the toiling masses as
mudsills and white slaves; defying the Government, its Constitution and its
laws, has openly pronounced itself the unappeasable enemy of the Republic.").
153. See tenBroek, supra note 135, at 171 ("[The Thirteenth Amendment's]
history, subsequent to enactment, has never lived up to its historic promise as
the 'grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all of the human
race within the jurisdiction of this government.'" (quoting Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872))).
154. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72 ("Undoubtedly while negro slavery
was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids
any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese
coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within
our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void."); see also
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240-41 (1911) ("While the immediate concern
[of the Thirteenth Amendment] was with African slavery, the Amendment was
not limited to that. It was a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons, of
whatever race, color, or estates, under the flag.").
155. See DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED
LABOR AFTER SLAVERY 1-28 (1978); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part 2: The
Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646, 663-71 (1982) (outlining lower federal
court responses to southern statutory schemes).
156. See NOVAK, supra note 155, at 1-8 (describing in detail the vagrancy
codes established throughout the south); Schmidt, supra note 155, at 649-51
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indigents arrested under the Codes were forced to work under
contract for landowners who paid their fines, sometimes after
having been "hired out" at auction.1 57 If a worker failed to
complete the term of the new contract, he would be arrested,
fined, and forced back into labor, thus creating an almostunbreakable cycle of servitude.15 ' The federal government
failed to challenge these statutory constructs until the early
twentieth century, and the first
efforts in the lower federal
5 9
courts achieved mixed results. 1

The Supreme Court eventually addressed the progeny of
160
the Black Codes through the lens of the Anti-Peonage Act,
passed by Congress in 1867 pursuant to its Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement authority.' 6 '
The first of the
peonage cases came before the Court in 1905 and the last in
1944.162 Though "peonage," defined as "a status or condition
of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the
peon to the master,"" 3 is only a limited sub-class of
involuntary servitude, a number of themes run consistently
through the peonage cases, that clarify the scope and function
of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on involuntary
servitude, as well as the principles that underlie the Court's
interpretation of the Amendment.
(describing the vagrancy codes established throughout the south); see also
Thompson v. Bunton, 22 S.W. 863 (Mo. 1893) (granting relief to habeas corpus
petitioner subject to being hired out for six months to highest bidder after noncriminal finding of vagrancy).
157. NOVAK, supra note 155, at 31-41.
158. Id.; Schmidt, supra note 155, at 650.
159. See Schmidt, supra note 155, at 663-71; William Wirt Howe, The
Peonage Cases, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (1904) (noting that the first criminal
prosecution under the Anti-Peonage Act did not occur until 1901 and discussing
subsequent lower court decisions).
160. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1994 (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006)).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 218
(1905).
162. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S.
25 (1942); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219 (1911); Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 207. It is noteworthy that while the
cases considered by the Supreme Court involved only statutory provisions
enacted by Southern legislatures, peonage was a pervasive problem throughout
the United States in the early half of the twentieth century. See Pollock, 322
U.S. at 18-20 & nn.29-32 (describing Congressional findings of peonage in
'every state in the Union except Oklahoma and Connecticut" (citing Report on
Peonage, Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Comm'n 447, S.DOC. No. 747,
61st Cong., 3d Sess.)).
163. Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215.
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First, the Court repeatedly struck down statutory
schemes that, either de jure or de facto, made the breach of a
labor contract a criminal offense on the ground that a
condition of involuntary servitude exists when labor is
coerced by threat of criminal sanction. As the Court first
explained in Bailey v. Alabama, "[t]he state may impose
involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may
not compel one man to labor for another in payment of a debt,
by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform the
service or pay the debt." 6 ' In Pollock v. Williams, the Court
reiterated the point: "[N]o state can make the quitting of
sanctions
work any component of a crime, or make criminal
5
16
labor."
to
persons
unwilling
holding
available for
Second, the Court recognized that the existence of an
agreement between a master and servant, entered into
voluntarily or otherwise, is irrelevant to whether the servant
labors in a condition of involuntary servitude:
The fact that the debtor contracted to perform the labor
which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the
attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the
statute. The full intent of the constitutional provision
could be defeated with obvious facility if, through the
been made,
guise of contracts under which advances had
66
1
service.
compulsory
to
held
be
could
debtors
As a corollary, the Court recognized that peonage differs
from a constitutional, voluntary labor agreement, because
while the peon must either work off the debt or be punished
criminally, "the debtor . . . [is] subject, like any other
contractor, to an action for damages for breach of [his]
contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force
compels performance or a continuance of the service."167 This
164. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244.
165. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18; see also Taylor, 315 U.S. at 29 ("The necessary
consequence is that one who has received an advance on a contract for services
which he is unable to repay is bound by the threat of penal sanction to remain
at his employment until the debt has been discharged. Such coerced labor is
peonage.... It is of course clear that peonage is a form of involuntary servitude
within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.... ."); Reynolds, 235 U.S. at
146 ("This labor is performed under the constant coercion and threat of another
possible arrest and prosecution in case he violates the labor contract which he
has made with the surety .... Compulsion of such service by the constant fear
of imprisonment under the criminal laws renders the work compulsory...
166. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242.
167. Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215-16.
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point reiterates that the existence of criminal, rather than
civil, sanctions differentiates involuntary from voluntary
servitude.
Third, the Supreme Court consistently echoed the
abolitionist rhetoric of the Thirteenth Amendment's
supporters, emphasizing the centrality of free labor precepts
in interpreting the scope of the Amendment. In Bailey, the
Court recognized that the goal of the Amendment was "to
render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor free, by
prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one
man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit, which is
the essence of involuntary servitude." 16 The Supreme Court
reiterated the point in Pollock: "The undoubted aim of the
Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Antipeonage
Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of
completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United
States." 169 These decisions underscore that the Amendment's
reach extends beyond African slavery and its direct analogues
to any servitude that undermines the American system of free
and voluntary labor.
Fourth, the Court recognized that the Thirteenth
Amendment's guarantee of free labor serves the practical end
of protecting workers from unduly harsh labor conditions by
guaranteeing the right to change jobs freely:
[Tihe defense against oppressive hours, pay, working
conditions, or treatment is the right to change employers.
When the master can compel and the laborer cannot
escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to
redress and no incentive above to relieve a harsh
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.
Resulting depression of working conditions and living
standards affects not only the laborer under the system,
but every other
with whom his labor comes in
0
competition. 17
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment not only protects
individual workers caught in conditions of involuntary
servitude from unsafe working conditions, but also prevents

168. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 241.
169. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 17-18; see also Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245 ("There is no
more important concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which
alone can enduring prosperity be based.").
170. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18.
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other workers from being forced to accept poor conditions in
order to compete with those compelled to serve.
C. The Kozminski Decision
Following Pollock, the Supreme Court did not address the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on involuntary
servitude for more than four decades. In 1947, however,
Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1584, which punishes anyone
who "knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude
or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other
person for any term." 171 Following its passage, the Federal
Courts of Appeals split over whether a threat of physical
harm or criminal sanction is required to create a condition of
involuntary servitude, or if other means of coercion can be

sufficient. 172
This circuit split set the stage for the Supreme Court's
most recent discussion of the scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment's ban on involuntary servitude in United States
v. Kozminski. 73 Ike and Margarethe Kozminski, operators of
a dairy farm in Michigan, forced two mentally handicapped
men, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris, to live in inhumane
conditions at their farm and to work daily for no pay. 174 The
Kozminskis physically and verbally abused the men when
they failed to work, threatened at least one of them with
institutionalization, forbade them from leaving the farm or
communicating with outsiders, and returned them to the
farm when they left it." 5 A jury convicted the Kozminskis of,
inter alia, violating § 1584 by knowingly holding Fulmer and
Molitoris in a condition of involuntary servitude. 176
The
defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly
instructed the jury that coercion that does not arise from
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2006). A violation of § 1584 is punishable by a
sentence of up to twenty years or, if death results from the involuntary
servitude, of life. Id; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006) (imposing the same
punishments with respect to conditions of peonage).
172. Compare United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1453-55 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that non-physical coercion can create a condition of involuntary
servitude), with United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding
that coercion by threats of force, criminal sanction, or continued imprisonment
is required to hold another in involuntary servitude).
173. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
174. Id. at 935.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 934.
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sanctions can create a
threats of physical violence or criminal
77
condition of involuntary servitude. 1
The Supreme Court adopted the narrower definition of
involuntary servitude that was submitted by the defendants,
and upheld the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the Kozminskis'
convictions. 178 In reaching its decision, the Court first noted
that under § 1584, Congress intended the term "involuntary
servitude" to be co-extensive with the understanding of the
Thirteenth
Amendment's
prohibition
on
involuntary
servitude that prevailed when the statute was passed.'7 9 The
Court then found that involuntary servitude historically could
result from two kinds of coercion. First, the Court examined
its earlier peonage decisions and noted that in each case a
condition of involuntary servitude existed because labor had
been compelled by the threat of criminal sanction. s0 These
prior cases, coupled with the Amendment's express exception
for involuntary servitude as punishment for a crime, led the
Court to conclude that "involuntary servitude includes at
least situations in which the victim is compelled to work by
law."' 8 '
Second, the Court deduced that because the
Thirteenth Amendment sought to abolish conditions "akin to
African slavery," it also forbids servitude compelled by threat
82
of physical harm.
The Court rejected the Government's argument that
"involuntary servitude" should be construed broadly to
"prohibit the compulsion of services by any means that, from
the victim's point of view, either leaves the victim with no
tolerable alternative but to serve the defendant or deprives
177. Id. at 937-39.
178. Id. at 952.
179. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944-48 (1988). The Supreme
Court expressly left open the possibility that the Thirteenth Amendment's ban
on involuntary servitude is broader than the definition of involuntary servitude
identified in its opinion. Id. at 944 ("We draw no conclusions from this
historical survey about the potential scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.").
Speculation on potential expansion of the Thirteenth Amendment is
unnecessary for purposes of this article, however, because, as explained infra
Part III.A, the situation faced by coerced informants fits within the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment as discussed in Kozminski.
180. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942-43 (citing Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4
(1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); United States v. Reynolds, 235
U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Clyatt v. United
States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905)).
181. Id. at 942.
182. Id.
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the victim of the power of choice." 8 3 This construction, the
Court noted, would make criminal liability dependent upon
the victim's state of mind."s Instead, the Court held that
"the term 'involuntary servitude' necessarily means a
condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for
the defendant by the use or threat of coercion through law or
the legal process."' 8 5
III. APPLYING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO COERCED
INFORMANTS

The Kozminski decision streamlines the argument for
applying the Thirteenth Amendment to the use of coerced
informants. Though the Court's prior involuntary servitude
jurisprudence involved only cases of alleged peonage,
Kozminski confirmed that the Thirteenth Amendment applies
outside of that context. 186 As a result, the Thirteenth
Amendment analysis of coerced informants no longer requires
1 87
any discussion of the informant's indebtedness to the state.
A. The PrimaFacieArgument
As the Court held in Kozminski, the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits "a condition of servitude in which the
victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat
of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat
of coercion through law or the legal process."18 8
This
standard can be broken down into two elements: first, the
victim must engage in "work" of some kind at the behest of
another; and second, the victim's continued performance of
that labor must be enforced by the use or threat of physical

183. Id. at 949.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 952.
186. Although the Court reversed the Kozminskis' conviction, it affirmed the
Sixth Circuit's refusal to find that a judgment of acquittal was warranted.
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 953 (1988) ("[Blecause we believe the
record contains sufficient evidence of physical or legal coercion to enable a jury
to convict the Kozminskis even under the stricter standard of involuntary
servitude that we announce today, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a
judgment of acquittal is unwarranted.").
187. The necessity of focusing on indebtedness led to prior analyses being
more contorted than is required under Kozminski. See Misner & Clough, supra

note 24, at 732-34.
188. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.
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89
harm or legal process. 1
With respect to the first element, the Court has not
defined exactly what minimum level of work must be
compelled before the Thirteenth Amendment is violated. 9 0
Nonetheless, the Court's peonage cases and Thirteenth
Amendment decisions in lower courts show that at a
minimum, work of economic value is enough to satisfy the
definition of involuntary servitude. In the peonage cases, the
Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment was violated
when the victims were compelled to engage in farm labor

189. See, e.g., United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1000 (1st Cir. 1995) ("In
sum, the requisite compulsion under section 1584 obtains when an individual,
through an actual or threatened use of physical or legal coercion, intentionally
causes the oppressed person reasonably to believe . . . that she has no
alternative but to remain in involuntary service for a time."); Doe I v. Gap, Inc.,
No. CV-01-0031, 2001 WL 1842389, at *7 (D. N. Mar. I. Nov. 26, 2001) ("To
establish the crime of involuntary servitude under 18 U.S.C. § 1584, a
prosecutor must allege and prove beyond a reasonable doubt the use or
threatened use of physical restraint, physical coercion or legal coercion to
compel labor." (citing Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952)).
190. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 945 ("While the general spirit of the phrase
'involuntary servitude' is easily comprehended, the exact range of conditions it
prohibits is harder to define."). The Court has recognized exceptions to the
Thirteenth Amendment's ban on involuntary servitude for government
compulsion of certain civic duties, such as jury service, roadwork, and military
service, and exceptional situations well-established in common law, including
parental control of their children and laws preventing the desertion of sea
vessels. Id. at 944 (citing Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11
(1973); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918); Butler v. Perry,
240 U.S. 328 (1916); Roberston v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897)). These
exceptions share a common-law lineage that predates the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment. See Butler, 240 U.S. at 330-33 (discussing long
common-law precedent for compelled roadwork and holding that the Thirteenth
Amendment "introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always
treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement
of those duties which individuals owe to the state, such as services in the army,
militia, on the jury, etc."). Providing active assistance to the state does not
share this historical foundation, however. While there is precedent for a duty to
provide the police with information about past crimes, see Vogel v. Gruaz, 110
U.S. 311, 316 (1884) ("[Ilt is the duty of every citizen to communicate to his
government any information which he has of the commission of an offense
against its laws ... ."), that duty is best characterized as moral rather than
legal. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: "Duty to
Report" Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 8-9
(2002) (noting absence of affirmative legal duties to report crimes under federal
and majority of state laws). Moreover, despite misprision of felony statutes that
may suggest otherwise, the duty to assist the police historically has been
limited to providing information and has not included active assistance in
apprehending or preventing crime. Gabriel D. M. Ciociola, Misprision of Felony
and Its Progeny, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 697, 700-01 (2003).
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under threat of criminal sanction.' 9 1 Other courts have found
Thirteenth Amendment violations where the victim was
coerced into performing household work, 192 working in a
medical office, 93 and engaging in prostitution. 9 Indeed, at
least one circuit has held that the coerced labor need not even
have economic value and that any coerced expenditure of
physical or mental effort for the benefit of another may be
sufficient. 195
In light of these precedents, the work undertaken by
coerced informants easily meets the Thirteenth Amendment
threshold.
As defined previously, 1 coerced informants
gather physical evidence, wear recording devices, infiltrate
alleged criminal organizations, and establish personal and
19 7
sometimes sexual relationships with suspected criminals.
All of these activities have significant value to police and
prosecutors. The successful prosecution of vice crimes and
criminal enterprises depends in great part on the use of
informants,198 and evidence obtained by active informants can
be the lynchpin in a particular case.' 99 Indeed, the state

191. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 230 (1911) (involving contract to
work for one year as a farm hand); see also Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 19
n.30 (1944) (describing peonage system in Maine involving foreign laborers
forced to work for lumber companies).
192. United State v. Djoumessi, 538 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Azanki, 54 F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995).
193. United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2008).
194. United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated on
othergrounds, 544 U.S. 902 (2005).
195. United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008)
("'Labor' means the expenditure of physical or mental effort. 'Services' means
conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or something.").
196. See supra Part I.B.
197. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
198. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at vii ("From the dawn of our
history, internal law and order has had to depend in greater or less measure on
the informer. While we hope that [new forensic techniques] will be helpful, they
will, in most cases, only minimize the importance of and not eliminate the
necessity for the informer."); SKOLNICK, supra note 56, at 119 ("There can be no
doubt that informants are essential for law enforcement, especially for narcotics
control.")
199. See, e.g., United States v. Landrau-Lopez, 444 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2006)
("DEA confidential informant infiltrated the smuggling ring. Posing as a cocaine
supplier, the informant brokered a deal with Melvin Poupart to smuggle [thirty]
kilograms of what was actually 'sham' cocaine onto a flight from LMMIA to
Newark, New Jersey."); United States v. Abdullahu, 488 F. Supp. 2d 433, 435
(D.N.J. 2007) ("[Informants] earned the trust of defendant and the other
charged individuals and ultimately learned about the plan to attack Fort Dix.");
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routinely quantifies the value of work done by active
informants by paying them.2"' Likewise, it is axiomatic that
were it not for active informants, police officers would be paid
to collect the evidence that these informants now obtain. 201
With respect to the second element, a coerced informant's
labor, is by definition, performed under threat of criminal
punishment. Once the coerced informant has agreed to work
for the police and until the police or prosecutor deems her
services completed, she has two options: continue to do as the
police ask, or face either prosecution on new criminal charges
20 2
Of
or longer criminal penalties from pending charges.
course, this choice is typically framed as an offer of leniency
by the state,2 °3 but regardless of the gloss put on it, the
coerced informant's decision is the same as the peon's-work
or be subject to criminal process.2 °4 This dilemma falls
squarely within the Kozminski standard for involuntary
servitude.
B. ConsideringSome Obvious Criticisms
Two obvious differences between coerced informants and
"typical" involuntary servants raise questions about the

United States v. Hector, No. CR 04-00860 DDP, 2008 WL 2025069, at *20 (C.D.
Cal. May 8, 2008) (discussing the case based mainly on circumstantial evidence
and "the informant-as the only direct evidence tying Defendant Hector to the
crime-was a crucial witness"); Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353,
1365 (W.D. Mich. 1983) ("Any information which the FBI had was gained
exclusively through the use of confidential informants and documentation
generated through the use of informants.").
200. See supra note 57 (listing examples); see also SKOLNICK, supra note 56,
at 123-24 (noting that burglary informants "are sometimes paid substantial
sums of money").
201. See MALLORY, supra note 11, at 2-4 (setting forth a multitude of ways in
which informants can assist police and prosecutors in the development and
prosecution of cases).
202. See supra Part I.C.1.
203. See, e.g., Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2008)
(discussing section 1983 action brought by informant who "agreed to serve as a
confidential informant in exchange for more lenient treatment"); Hervey v.
State, 764 So. 2d 457, 459-60 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that federal
witness tampering statute was not violated for allowing testimony from an
undercover informant who was promised leniency if he participated in a
controlled buy).
204. See O'HARA & O'HARA, supra note 51, at 190 (recognizing that an
informant "who is apprehended in the commission of a minor offense and seeks
to avoid prosecution by revealing information concerning a major crime" is
motivated by "[alvoidance of [p]unishment").
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propriety of applying the Thirteenth Amendment in the
informant context. First, the service provided by a coerced
informant may fit at least the colloquial definition of
"voluntary," especially if the informants actively seeks to
work for the police or never attempts to breach his
cooperation agreement. 0 5 This realization suggests that
unless the circumstances of servitude alone, regardless of the
mental state of the servant, can create a condition of
involuntary servitude, many coerced informants are not held
in a condition of involuntary servitude.
Second, unlike the peon who works under the threat of a
criminal charge that arises directly from his failure to fulfill
the terms of his labor contract, the coerced informant faces a
valid criminal prosecution that arises from actions
independent of and preceding the agreement to serve.2 06 This
distinction requires an examination of the Amendment's
language and raises the issue of whether a Thirteenth
Amendment violation can arise from an otherwise valid
threat.
1. Voluntariness
It is not difficult to imagine that the relationship between
Rachel Hoffman and the Tallahassee Police Department could
have ended with both parties satisfied. Hoffman, like many
coerced informants, agreed with at least some level of volition
to assist the TPD and was happy to have an opportunity to
avoid the negative consequences that would have resulted
from another prosecution on drug charges.2 °7 Meanwhile, the
TPD welcomed the opportunity to use a relatively minor drug
offender to obtain evidence of more severe crimes against
other dealers.20 8 In this case, that meant using Hoffman, a
205. See, e.g., Boyington v. State, 389 So. 2d 485, 487 (Miss. 1980) (discussing
the fact that the informant told police during extradition that he would like
"help himself by becoming an informant)
206. For the purposes of this part, this article assumes that the threatened
criminal charges are based on valid, admissible evidence sufficient to sustain a
conviction. Given that at least some police are advised to bluff and recruit
informants by threatening charges for which there is insufficient evidence to
obtain an indictment, see supra note 93 and accompanying text, this assumption
is unsound in an unknown number of coerced informant cases. Nonetheless, by
assuming the validity of the changes, we address the strongest
counterargument to applying the Thirteenth Amendment in this context.
207. Portman, supra note 4.
208. See SKOLNICK, supra note 56, at 118 ("The narcotics officer is primarily
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low-level marijuana dealer, to get evidence of narcotics and
firearm trafficking by Bradshaw and Green.2 9 There is no
evidence that Hoffman ever sought to back out of the
agreement; indeed, when the arranged deal began to fall
apart, Hoffman may have pushed on against the direction of
her police handler.210 Had Hoffman successfully and safely
completed the drug buy, this one deal might have been
enough to satisfy the TPD.211 If so, the TPD presumably
would have released her from her service and never
prosecuted her for the drugs found during the April 2008
search, and both parties would have gone their separate
ways, wholly satisfied with the arrangement. Would the
Thirteenth Amendment still have been violated if this had
happened?
This question can be generalized and broken into two
distinct parts. First, does the coerced informant's initial
voluntary decision to assist the state shield the relationship
from Thirteenth Amendment scrutiny? Second, must the
coerced informant wish to break the agreement at some point
for the servitude to be involuntary? The first question is
quickly resolved by reference to the Supreme Court's peonage
cases.21 2 As the Court made clear in Bailey, the existence of
interested in uncovering a large cache, and for this to happen, informants must
be employed.").
209. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
210. See Presentment, supra note 1, 5.
211. See Portman, supra note 4 (according to her boyfriend, Hoffman believed
that she needed to complete only "one big deal" to satisfy her obligations to the
TPD).
212. One of the few courts to address the applicability of the Thirteenth
Amendment to a coerced -informant erroneously dismissed the informant's
argument on this basis. See Boyington v. State, 389 So. 2d 485 (Miss. 1980). In
Boyington, the defendant was indicted in Mississippi on charges arising from
the sale of marijuana to an undercover agent. Id. at 487. After being
apprehended in Pennsylvania, he waived extradition and, en route to
Mississippi, told a Bureau of Narcotics agent that he wanted to "help himself."
Id. The agent told Boyington that if he served as an informant for the Bureau,
the agent would recommend probation on the marijuana charges. Id. at 487-88.
Boyington worked for the Bureau for six months and assisted in the
development of ten cases. Id. at 488. Despite the prosecutor's recommendation
that he receive probation, the trial court refused to accept a plea bargain for
probation and indicated that Boyington would be sentenced to two years. Id.
Boyington rejected the plea, went to trial, and was convicted and sentenced to
eight years in prison. Id. at 487-88. Boyington appealed, arguing in part that
his employment as a confidential informant violated the Thirteenth
Amendment. Id. at 488. The Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed this
argument summarily, noting only that Boyington "freely and voluntarily
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an initial voluntary agreement does not remove the
relationship from the Thirteenth Amendment's purview;
rather, the focus of the Thirteenth Amendment analysis is on
the existence of a criminal sanction should the servant fail to
perform. 13 Labor contracts generally are valid because the
servant, even though he is "subject like any other contractor
to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect
at any time to break it, and no law or force compels
performance or a continuance of the service." 214
Thus,
"compulsion of . . . service by the constant fear of
imprisonment under the criminal laws" violates the
Thirteenth Amendment, regardless of how the service
begins.2 15 To hold otherwise would allow easy circumvention
of the Amendment's prohibition any time an employer could
obtain a laborer's signature on a contract.2 16
This answer only makes the second question more
important. Because the Court has consistently discussed the
Thirteenth Amendment
in the context of service that is
"compelled," 21 7 "forced," 21 8 or "coerced," 21 9 all terms that imply
that the service is at some point involuntary.2 20 In common
parlance, the term "involuntary" is amenable to two
meanings.
According to the Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, for instance, an action is involuntary if it is done
either "contrary to . . . choice" or "without choice." 221 Under
the first meaning, and analogous to common-law torts like
entered into the arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics." Id.
213. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243 (1911).
214. Id.
215. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
216. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242.
217. Id. at 227.
218. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.
219. Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942).
220. The difficulty of divining the meaning of "involuntary" in the context of
the ban on involuntary servitude is underscored by the Court's cryptic and
circular observation in United States v. Reynolds that "[clompulsion of . . .
service by the constant fear of imprisonment under the criminal laws renders
the work compulsory." United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146 (1914).
221. Merriam-Webster
Online
Dictionary.com,
http'//www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/involuntary (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) (defining
"involuntary" as "done contrary to or without choice"). In Kozminski, the trial
court instructed the jury similarly that involuntary means, "done contrary to or
without choice-compulsory-not subject to control of the will." Kozminsky, 487
U.S. at 936-37 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court neither accepted
nor rejected this instruction.

720

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:50

battery 222 or crimes like rape, 223 labor is involuntary only if
the servant possesses some affirmative desire to stop
working, and thus a prosecutor or plaintiff would be required
to prove a subjective lack of consent on the part of the servant
to establish a condition of involuntary servitude. 224 But
pursuant to the second meaning, a condition of servitude
could be involuntary if the alternatives to service are so dire
that the servant essentially is deprived of any choice at all.
This latter view of volition would not ask the jury to inquire
into the mental state of the servant; rather, the conditions of
service alone would be enough to establish involuntary
servitude.
Put another way, if labor is involuntary only if the
laborer subjectively does not wish to work, then an individual
effectively can waive the Amendment's ban on involuntary
However, while most
servitude as it applies to her.
constitutional protections can be waived,225 Professor Seth
Kreimer presents two theories for why the Thirteenth
Amendment's protections cannot.226 First, beyond protecting
an individual's right not to be forced into slavery, the
Thirteenth Amendment "defines ...the structure of a decent

society" and specifically "eradicate[es]

a social practice

222. See 6 AM. JuR. 2D Assault and Battery § 2 (2009) ("A battery is a

wrongful or offensive physical contact with another through the intentional
contact by the perpetrator and without the victim's consent.").
223. See Greene v. State, 673 S.E.2d 292, 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) ("[The trial

court explicitly instructed the jury that the State bore the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent to the conduct at
issue.").
224. See United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1263-65 (10th Cir. 2008)

(discussing whether sufficient evidence supported jury's finding that victims did
not subjectively consent to servitude).
225. See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 801

(1992) (recognizing that defendants can waive Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights in exchange for sentence reduction).
226. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights
in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1386-89 (1984); see also Kimberly
A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Restraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 154 (2008) (recognizing that Thirteenth

Amendment protections cannot be waived). Other non-waivable constitutional
provisions include Article III jurisdiction, the Establishment Clause, and the
Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 153-54;
Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L.

REV. 1135, 1191 (2008) (recognizing that Thirteenth Amendment protections
cannot be waived).
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deemed incompatible with a free society." 227 Thus, an
individual may not waive the Amendment's prohibition on
slavery, because doing so would undermine the Amendment's
broader societal purpose. Second, the prohibition on slavery
can be viewed as "self-paternalistic"; it protects individuals
from making a decision-here, selling oneself into slaverythat, however tempting it may seem at the time, a rational
citizen might wish that she did not have the power to
make.22 8
These arguments also have considerable force when
applied to involuntary servitude in the abstract.229
As
originally contemplated, the inclusion of involuntary
servitude in the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to
target labor systems, like long-term apprenticeships or
serfdom that, while not slavery in the strict sense, are
essentially equivalent to it from the standpoint of their
interference with individual rights and societal interests.23 °
As such, these conditions of involuntary servitude were
deemed as offensive to a free society as slavery, and allowing
waiver of the Amendment's protections would undermine this
broader societal interest. Similarly, if "involuntary servitude"
is conceived merely to include conditions of servitude like
peonage that are directly "akin to African slavery," 231 then
self-paternalism suggests that citizens should be protected
from making the unwise choice of agreeing to labor in such a

227. Kreimer, supra note 225, at 1387-88.
228. Id. at 1389. Professor Kreimer also explains that the Thirteenth
Amendment could be deemed un-waivable under a purely paternalistic
argument that choices made by victims of an inherently discriminatory society
are "unreliable." Id. at 1388. He convincingly rejects that argument, however,
as inconsistent with the "presuppositions of the rest of the American legal
system and not least the underpinnings of many constitutional rights." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
229. Some commentators have considered the prohibition on involuntary
servitude as part and parcel of the ban on slavery for purposes of waiver. See
Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1695
n.64 (2007). This approach is problematic as the term "involuntary servitude"
itself suggests that it should be treated differently. Because the word
"involuntary" can mean "contrary to choice," the issue of the servant's wishes
must be addressed more explicitly in order to ensure that the modifier retains
some meaning. Moreover, consideration of Professor Kreimer's argument in the
specific context of involuntary servitude provides a valuable opportunity to
relate the use of coerced informants to the Amendment's history and context.
230. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
231. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916).
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condition under the same logic that applies in the context of
slavery.
The use of coerced informants, however, is not what one
might immediately consider to be involuntary servitude "akin
to African slavery." Rather, one must consider whether
Professor Kreimer's logic carries the same force when the
service to which the Amendment might arguably be applied
drifts farther away from African slavery and the labor
systems intended to mimic it. 232 In the instant context, then,
the first question is whether the use of coerced informants is
offensive to the same fundamental societal values that
animated the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. As an
initial matter, the use of coerced informants interferes with
the informant's right to profit from her labor. A coerced
informant's work has significant value, as shown by the
substantial sums, which can run into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars, that police are willing to pay active,
non-coerced informants. 233 The value of a coerced informant's
work stems largely from her criminal connections, which
police officers may be unable to recreate or which, at the
very least, would require the investment of enormous
police time.234 Yet, coerced informants are unpaid and thus
deprived of the fruits of their valuable labor. Of course, lesser
punishment and freedom from criminal prosecution can be
viewed as a form of payment. But this reward is not one that
society is willing to place an economic value on, because
criminals are not permitted to buy an acquittal or purchase a
lighter sentence.2 35 Moreover, as discussed later, allowing
coerced informants to be paid for their work with leniency
undermines the integrity and communicative value of
criminal punishment in high-crime communities.23 6
232. This concern echoes that of some commentators who see attempts to
apply the Thirteenth Amendment to novel situations as a potential threat to the
core force of the Amendment. See Carter, supra note 37, at 1356 n.160 ("Overly
creative interpretations of the Amendment that pay little attention to its actual
history and context can result in cases and scholarship diminishing the
Amendment rather than strengthening it.").
233. See supra note 57.
234. MALLORY, supra note 11, at 2-4.
235. But see R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERIcAN BAIL
SYSTEM 32 (1965) ("The American bail system discriminates against and
punishes the poor. The rich can afford to buy their freedom, and do; the poor go
to jail because they cannot afford the premium for a bail bond.").
236. See infra Part VI.
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The threat of criminal sanctions also interferes with the
coerced informant's right to escape "oppressive hours, pay,
working conditions, or treatment" by leaving one job for
another. 237 This right was of particular importance in the
Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction eras, when the
Southern states, through legislative action, forced significant
numbers of civilians to work under extremely dangerous
conditions for little or no pay under threat of criminal
Coerced informants face a similar
punishment. 23
predicament. They are civilians given little or no training
and compelled to work in environments where they face likely
injury or death if their cooperation with the police is
And, like a peon, a coerced informant who
discovered.
realizes that her life is in danger has few options to escape
the situation without facing the possibility of additional
criminal punishment for doing so.
Finally, as discussed in more detail below, the
widespread use of informants causes a number of attendant
societal ills that reach far beyond the informants
themselves. 239 These harms, though different in detail than
the collateral effects of slavery and peonage, are nonetheless
broad in their reach, extending beyond the servant to other
innocent parties and society in general.
Of course, there are features of the peonage and slavery
systems that differ from the use of coerced informants. Most
notably, though law enforcement generally and narcotics
enforcement more specifically are frequently criticized for
racial bias,24 ° the use of coerced informants does not involve
the same level of racial animus or unequal racial impact
inherent in both slavery and peonage. Regardless, to limit
237. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
238. See NOVAK, supra note 155, at 18-43 (noting, inter alia, that convict
labor leased out to private entrepreneurs suffered annual mortality rates of
sixteen to forty-five percent).
239. See infra Part VI.
240. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A
Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and ConstitutionalLiterature, and of
Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275-76 (2004)
("For the most part, the data consistently show disproportionate searches of
African-American and Hispanic motorists in relation to their estimated
representation on the road."); Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the
Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1660, 1673 (1996) (discussing the
racial disparities resulting from harsher penalties for crack versus powder
cocaine).
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the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment only to servitude
based on some immutable characteristic ignores the
Amendment's broad language and weakens the moral force it
gains from its absolute prohibition on slavery and involuntary
servitude.2 4 ' With these societal concerns in mind, Professor
Kreimer's reasoning for not allowing waiver of the Thirteenth
Amendment protection applies with equal force to the use of
coerced informants. The state's use of the threat of criminal
sanctions interferes with the coerced informant's natural
rights, and the collateral harms caused thereby make the use
of coerced informants, like involuntary servitude generally,
"incompatible with a free society."
Thus, an individual
should not be permitted to waive the ban on involuntary
servitude and agree to serve as a coerced informant.
Professor Kreimer's "self-paternalism" argument also
justifies prohibiting the waiver of Thirteenth Amendment
protections by coerced informants. Coerced informants labor
under threat of severe injury or death, should their
cooperation with police be discovered.24 2 The terms by which
they are able to escape that danger are typically unclear and
the determination of whether they have met those terms is
out of their control.24 3 Thus, even though some individuals
may choose voluntarily to become coerced informants, the
danger and uncertainty of that work suggest that agreeing to
become a coerced informant is a decision individuals may
wish that they did not have the power to make.2'"
Finally, it is worth noting that an involuntary servitude
standard that is not dependent upon the informant's mental
state is consistent with the Supreme Court's Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. While the peonage cases did not
require the Court to decide whether the servant must

241. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) ("Undoubtedly while
negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the
thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If
Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the
Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be
trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the States which
properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that
protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of African
descent.").
242. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 84-86, 119 and accompanying text.
244. See Kreimer, supra note 225, at 1389.
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subjectively desire to stop working,24 5 the Court repeatedly
struck entire statutory schemes rather than finding
Thirteenth Amendment violations on a case-by-case basis.24 6
But if the crux of a finding of involuntary servitude were the
laborer's subjective desire to stop working, these statutory
schemes could have been allowed to stand in favor of a caseby-case analysis.
Moreover, in Kozminski, the Court
specifically refused to adopt a standard for involuntary
servitude that would have required inquiry into the mental
state of the victim. 24 7 Though this reasoning was based at
least in part on lenity concerns particular to the criminal
statute at issue, it suggests that servitude guaranteed by
threat of criminal sanction or physical harm is inherently
coercive, regardless of the servant's subjective mental state.
2. Independence of Criminal Charges
In its peonage cases, the Supreme Court invalidated on
Thirteenth Amendment grounds numerous statutory schemes
that shared one common characteristic: they made the breach
of a labor contract a crime.24 s
The coerced informant's
situation is different. Like the peon, the informant who
chooses not to work for the police is subject to criminal
charges or greater punishment, but unlike the peon, those
charges arise independently of the cooperation agreement and
could be proven legally and constitutionally if they were

245. The laborer's desire to work was not at issue because in each of the
peonage cases, the servant either was subject to criminal prosecution for
refusing to work or had previously fled his employment.
See Pollock v.
Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 6 (1944) (addressing a laborer who refused to work and
was convicted of fraudulently entering into labor contract); Taylor v. Georgia,
315 U.S. 25, 27 (1942); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 139-40 (1914);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 230-31 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197
U.S. 208, 218-19 (1905) (discussing petitioner challenged conviction for
returning laborer who had fled to condition of peonage).
246. See, e.g., Pollock, 322 U.S. at 25 ("[W]e are compelled to hold that the
Florida Act of 1919 as brought forward on the statutes as §§ 817.90 and 817.10
of the Statutes of 1941, F.S.A. are, by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment and
the Anti-peonage Act of the United States, null and void.").
247. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949-50 (1988)
("Moreover, as the Government would interpret the statutes, the type of
coercion prohibited would depend entirely upon the victim's state of mind.
Under such a view, the statutes would provide almost no objective indication of
the conduct or condition they prohibit, and thus would fail to provide fair notice
to ordinary people who are required to conform their conduct to the law.").
248. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
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pursued prior to that agreement. 249
For instance, the
threatened charges that motivated Hoffman to cooperate with
the TPD arose from the drugs and drug paraphernalia that
were found during an apparently valid search of her
apartment, and the state's attorney could have validly
prosecuted her on charges stemming from that evidence.2 5 °
But does the independent validity of the criminal charges
mean that the state may use them to compel an individual to
work as an informant?
At best, an affirmative answer to this question suggests
that an individual who has committed a criminal offense is
not entitled to the same protection under the Thirteenth
Amendment as someone who has not.
Certainly, the
Amendment expressly excludes from its protections an
251
individual who has been "duly convicted" of a crime.
However, if an individual can be forced to work simply
because she may be validly prosecuted for a crime, then this
textual exception is superfluous. Additionally, conditioning
the existence of a Thirteenth Amendment violation on
whether the threat of prosecution is independently valid
raises a number of thorny practical issues. What standard
would have to be met before the individual could be compelled
to work for the state? Would probable cause or reasonable
suspicion be sufficient, or, as suggested by the text of the
Amendment, would the prosecution have to show actual
guilt? Would the prosecution have to show that it could meet
that standard prior to compelling the individual to serve or
could the state wait until the informant tried to enforce the
cooperation agreement or any criminal charges that the state
eventually brought? What forum would decide whether the
prosecution has met its burden, particularly if the state
eventually decides not to prosecute on the underlying
charges?
Furthermore, the Thirteenth Amendment's free labor
goals are no less undermined if the threats used to compel
service are of independently valid criminal prosecutions or of
249. Again this article assumes, solely for the purposes of making the
strongest argument against applying the Thirteenth Amendment to coerced
informants, that the state has valid and admissible evidence sufficient to
convict the informant on other criminal charges. See supra note 205.
250. See Presentment, supra note 1, $ 1.
251. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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prosecution based solely on the breach of a contract for
servitude. In either case, the servant provides valuable
service without pay and has no viable opportunity to escape
oppressive or dangerous working conditions.
Finally, there is nothing novel in the argument that the
threat of an otherwise valid prosecution is illegal. For
instance, the common-law crime of extortion involves a public
official, under color of his office, taking money to which he is
not entitled. 252 Similarly, blackmail punishes a defendant
who takes an action that he has a legal right to take, like
reporting criminal activity, for an improper purpose, such as
for monetary gain.2 53 Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause
forbids police and prosecutors from making otherwise valid
prosecution decisions on the basis of animus towards any
race, nationality, or other protected class.25 4 Though these
analogies are not complete, they suggest that the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition on labor that is coerced through
threat of criminal sanction may extend to cases where the
sanctions are otherwise constitutional.
Kozminski also
suggests that such an extension is appropriate, as the Court
notes that threats of deportation or institutionalization, valid
or not, could be sufficient to give rise to a condition of

252. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction between Bribery and
Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 86266 (1988).
253. Blackmail is "[a] threatening demand made without justification."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 180 (8th ed. 2004); see also MARX, supra note 104, at
156 ("The controller-informer relationship is usually seen to involve the former
controlling the latter. There may be a kind of institutionalized blackmail.
Prosecution, prison, and/or public denouncement as an informer are held in
abeyance as long as cooperation is forthcoming .... "). Moreover, as it is defined
today, extortion includes coerced payment or other action by threat of force. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (8th ed. 2004) ("The act or practice of obtaining
something or compelling some action by illegal means, as by force or coercion.");
see also People v. Hesslink, 167 Cal. App. 3d 781, 787-88 (Ct. App. 1985)
(rejecting appellant's argument that conviction for extortion arising from threat
to arrest prostitute must be overturned because appellant had legal right to
conduct citizen's arrest, noting that "even if defendant had the right to arrest
the victim, he was not at liberty to threaten to arrest her for the purpose of
extorting money or property from her"); Berger v. Berger, 466 So. 2d 1149, 1151
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing that husband violated Florida's extortion
statute when he threatened to turn his estranged wife into the I.R.S. despite
that he had a legal right to do so because he did not have the right "to threaten
to do it for his own pecuniary advantage").
254. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
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involuntary servitude.2 55
IV. A NEW MODEL FOR THE USE OF ACTIVE INFORMANTS
Recognizing that the Thirteenth Amendment forbids the
use of coerced informants will require significant changes in
how the state uses informants. These changes will impact all
phases of the state-informant relationship, from the
recruitment of new informants to the handling of active
informants and attempts by injured informants to achieve
redress. Though it is not exhaustive, this part sets forth a
model of the state-informant relationship that incorporates at
least some of those changes.
A. Recruitment
The most obvious change required by the Thirteenth
Amendment is that police and prosecutors may not use the
threat of criminal sanctions, couched as an offer of leniency or
otherwise, to recruit active informants. This prohibition,
however, leaves open at least three other recruitment options.
First, the police may offer leniency to individuals in
exchange for information already in their possession.25 6 For
instance, a drug user or low-level dealer could exchange
information about the source of her drugs for a lighter
sentence, or an individual facing prosecution could give the
police information about an unrelated, unsolved crime in
exchange for dismissal of charges. Second, to the extent that
the state desires to recruit a civilian as an active informant,
the police or prosecutor may appeal to any motive other than
fear of criminal prosecution to encourage cooperation. For
instance, the police could offer the individual money or play to
her sense of civic duty, her desire to make amends for past
255. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S.
possible that threatening an incompetent
immigrant with deportation could constitute
induces involuntary servitude....").
256. Though a detailed discussion of

931, 948 (1988) ("Similarly, it is
with institutionalization or an
the threat of legal coercion that
the

Thirteenth

Amendment's

application to informants who only provide previously-obtained information to
the police is beyond the scope of this article, the long common-law history of
criminal misprision statutes, see Ciociola, supra note 190, at 699-706, suggests
that the duty to assist the state by merely sharing information may join other

long-standing duties, such as jury service, military service, and roadwork, as an
exception to the Thirteenth Amendment. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944
(listing other exceptions to the Thirteenth Amendment).
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crimes, or a desire for revenge to encourage her to assist the
police.
Should these avenues be unsuccessful or undesirable, the
police and prosecutors also may use the Thirteenth
Amendment's express exception for involuntary servitude "as
a punishment for crime where of the party shall have been
duly convicted."25 7 The state could charge and convict the
prospective informant at trial or negotiate a plea bargain
with her before requiring her to work off her sentence by
cooperating with the police as an active informant. Of course,
unlike more traditional forced labor, which can be imposed
effectively without the convict's assent, the individual's
agreement to cooperate would be required for the
Moreover, unlike current
arrangement to be effective.
arrangements between the state and coerced informants,
defense counsel would be involved in the negotiation of the
agreement, and the court would at least have knowledge of its
terms. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 contemplates
this sort of agreement and permits a motion for reduction of
sentence when a convicted defendant provides assistance in
investigating or prosecuting a third party.25 8 Some states
have similar rules.25 9
B. Handling
Much as an informant cannot be recruited with threats of
criminal sanctions, the police also cannot use such threats to
control a reticent or misbehaving active informant. But a
number of options remain for dealing with difficult
informants.
If an informant violates the terms of his
cooperation, then the police may withhold any payments, stop
using the informant, or attempt to coax the informant to
resume proper assistance through the use of any other
relevant leverage short of threats of criminal sanction or
physical harm.26 ° Thirteenth Amendment issues come to the
257. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,

§ 1.

258. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
259. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4220 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 893.135(4) (2008);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-31(g)(2) (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-409 (1992); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 21-28-4.19 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.3405(2) (West 1985).

260. While a threat of direct physical force by the police would clearly violate
the Thirteenth Amendment, see Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952, it is also worth
noting that the Thirteenth Amendment forbids the police from using an indirect
threat of force to compel cooperation. For instance, the police may not threaten
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forefront if the police learn that an informant has engaged in
unapproved criminal activity during the course of her
cooperation.
Under the current model, an informant's
handler typically will either terminate the relationship and
initiate criminal charges or use the threat of prosecution on
the new offense to compel additional cooperation. 2 61 With the
latter option foreclosed, the handler still has a number of
options: he may initiate criminal charges; forego prosecution
at least temporarily; ignore the new offense entirely; chastise
or otherwise punish the informant, such as with a reduction
in pay; or terminate the cooperation agreement and withhold
any benefit. The only thing the handler may not do is
condition his decision on whether to pursue criminal charges
on the informant's continued cooperation.
Where the active informant is a convict working in a
condition of involuntary servitude after being "duly
convicted,"2 62 the situation changes from the current model
because the convicted informant's cooperation will be subject
to the oversight of the sentencing judge.
Though the
sentencing judge is unlikely to be involved on a consistent
basis, she likely would be much more cognizant of the terms
and conditions of the informant's service than is the current
norm in the use of coerced informants.2 6 3 This judicial
oversight provides an avenue for both the informant and the
prosecution to raise any concerns about the informant's
cooperation. For instance, the informant could complain to
the sentencing judge if she believes that the state is
subjecting her to unnecessary risks,26
or that she has
to reveal an informant's status as a cooperator, thus making her the likely
target of criminals, in order to compel her service. See Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F.
Supp. 202, 205-06 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (alleging that officers threatened informant
with exposure to compel continued cooperation); Eugene Oscapella, A Study of
Informers in England, 1980 CRIM. L. REV. 136, 144 ("An unscrupulous officer
might, for example, hint to a theretofore secret informer that his identity will
'accidentally' be exposed if he does not cooperate.").
261. See supra notes 103, 111 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
263. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) and its state analogues are
again instructive. By requiring the sentencing judge to assess whether the
defendant has provided substantial assistance, these rules suggest that the
court will remain involved in the case.
264. For instance, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment may place limitations on the nature of assistance required of the
convict. See, e.g., Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that labeling an inmate a "snitch" violates the Eighth Amendment
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completed the required assistance but the state has not lived
up to its obligations.2 65 Similarly, if the prosecution feels that
the convicted informant has not complied with the terms of
the cooperation agreement, it could seek sanctions of some
sort, including a sentencing enhancement, fine, or judicial
determination of non-compliance that bars a motion for
leniency.
C. Termination and Redress for Injuries
Applying the Thirteenth Amendment to the relationship
between the state and active informants will change very
little the manner in which the cooperation relationship
terminates. The relationship still may end if the informant
decides not to cooperate any longer, the state terminates the
relationship for informant misconduct, the state no longer
requires the informant's assistance, or the informant is
seriously injured or killed.2 66 The only difference from the
current model is that the state's power to coerce additional
service if it decides that the informant has not fulfilled her
obligation will be limited to convicted informants. And,
unlike the coerced informant, whose only recourse if she
believes that the state has not fulfilled its end of the bargain
is a difficult legal challenge to a subsequent prosecution,26 7
the convicted informant who disputes the prosecutor's
decision may seek relief from the sentencing judge.
Moreover, given that a cooperation agreement between a
convicted informant and the state is likely to be more explicit
and more definite in its terms than current agreements
negotiated without court oversight, the resolution of any
dispute regarding the satisfaction of that agreement will not
depend as heavily on the relative credibility of the informant
and state agents.
In addition, should the police or prosecution use the
and compiling similar cases).
265. See, e.g., Eidman v. State, 671 S.E.2d 292, 293-94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
(considering and rejecting defendant's contention that he provided substantial
assistance sufficient to entitle him to a reduced sentence); State v. Johnson, 630
N.W.2d 583, 590 (Iowa 2001) (confirming sentencing court's discretion to
determine amount to reduce sentence for substantial assistance by confidential
informant and remanding for consideration of defendant's argument that he
was entitled to greater sentence reduction).
266. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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threat of criminal sanctions to compel assistance, the coerced
informant will have at least two new avenues to seek
redress.2 68 First, a coerced informant may complain to federal
authorities, who can charge the offending government agents
criminally under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 with holding the informant
in a condition of involuntary servitude.2 69 Of course, the
availability of this avenue may be curtailed by the
unwillingness of prosecutors to investigate or file criminal
charges against law enforcement officials generally and
federal investigators or attorneys more specifically. 270
Nonetheless, the possibility of criminal liability will hopefully
chill at least somewhat the use of threats of criminal
prosecution to compel informant cooperation.
Second, a coerced informant may file a civil action for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment by state entities responsible for the
use of threats of criminal sanctions to compel her service, as
well as for any injuries resulting from that service.2 7'
Similarly, a coerced informant working for federal officials
may assert a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics 272 for any injuries
resulting from a Thirteenth Amendment violation.273
268. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text. This article does not
attempt to set out an exhaustive assessment of the practical viability of
attempts to redress Thirteenth Amendment violations, as the law on remedies
for Thirteenth Amendment violations is woefully underdeveloped. Rather, it
seeks only to provide an outline of some avenues that eventually may be
pursued.
269. Similar state statutes exist, as well. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 181
(2009) (prohibiting holding another in a condition of involuntary servitude);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.349(1)(e) (2009) (defining kidnapping to include
holding a person in involuntary servitude); OHIO REV. CODE. § 2905.01(B)(3)
(2009) (defining kidnapping to include holding a person in involuntary
servitude). Despite the availability of state criminal avenues, convincing state
prosecutors to file charges against their colleagues or peers will face systemic
obstacles similar to those outlines above.
270. See David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 488 (1992) (discussing the unwillingness of
prosecutors to indict police for misconduct).
271. See, e.g., Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversing
dismissal of § 1983 claim alleging violation of the Thirteenth Amendment claim
relating to imprisonment for failure to pay fine).
272. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
273. See Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 946
(5th Cir. 1999) (finding deported immigrant's Thirteenth Amendment Bivens
claim non-frivolous). But see, e.g., Jane Doe I v. Reddy, No. C 02-05570 WA,
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Initially, a coerced informant's ability to recover against
individual defendants under § 1983 or Bivens will be limited
by arguments that qualified immunity applies because the
right in question is not clearly established. 274 These hurdles,
however, would only survive until Thirteenth Amendment
Moreover, coerced
jurisprudence develops more fully. 275
informants even at the outset, could seek damages from local
governmental entities that have policies permitting the use of
coerced informants.2 7 6
V. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE CONCERNS

Given the central role of active informants in most areas
of law enforcement, the suggestion that their use violates the
Thirteenth Amendment likely will inspire concern among law
enforcement officials. Perhaps more surprisingly, concerns
also are likely to be raised by defense attorneys and
sympathetic commentators, as many defendants and their
counsel see cooperation agreements as the simplest way to
avoid punishment.
A. Law Enforcement Concerns
Police and prosecutors generally, and particularly those
who work in areas, like narcotics, that are highly dependent
on informants, will have the most forceful concerns about
recognizing a constitutional prohibition on the use of coerced
informants.27 7 Much of this criticism likely will have a
2003 WL 23893010, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003) (rejecting private cause of
action against private citizens for Thirteenth Amendment violation and
asserting that 'no decision has ever actually upheld a private right of action

under the Thirteenth Amendment and many have rejected it").
274. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009); Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
275. Despite the Court's recent instruction in Pearson that courts faced with
qualified immunity issues need not address the existence of a constitutional

right before determining whether it is clearly established, 129 S. Ct. at 819-22,
courts retain discretion to do so and other avenues, such as suits for injunctive
relief, persist for the development of "new" constitutional rights. Id. at 821-22;
see Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary ConstitutionalRulings, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 847, 934-35 (2005) (noting alternative ways by which courts can decide the
contours of constitutional rights outside of section 1983 suits against

individuals).
276. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998)
(recognizing that qualified immunity is not available in actions against

municipalities).
277. See, e.g., HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 12 ("The short summary of
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practical bent: if effective law enforcement requires the use of
informants, then a constitutional limitation on the use of
informants presumably will hamstring the investigation and
prosecution of these crimes.
The most direct and principled response to these
concerns is simply that they are irrelevant.
Many
constitutional provisions make police work more difficult, but
such difficulties are oftentimes intentional, and even when
merely incidental do not justify ignoring the Constitution's
plain language. As the Supreme Court has recognized in the
Fourth Amendment context, "the forefathers, after consulting
the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place
obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance,
which they seemed to think was a greater danger to a free
people than
the escape
of some criminals from
punishment."2 7
Similar reasoning applies here: Congress
drafted and passed, and the States ratified, a sweeping ban
on slavery and involuntary servitude on the belief that these
conditions are offensive to a free society and interfere with
the natural rights of the citizenry.2 79 This ban cannot be
ignored simply because it is inconvenient.
That being said, on the few occasions that coerced
informants have raised Thirteenth Amendment arguments,
courts have dismissed them with little analysis, suggesting
that perceived practical concerns may prevent their serious
consideration.2 8 °
Also, despite its occasional sweeping
declarations to the contrary, the Court does weigh practical
considerations when considering the scope of some
constitutional protections, such as the due process clause,2 8 '

the stated value of the informer from the prosecution point of view is that he is
almost indispensable in narcotics cases. With this we agree. . . ."); SKOLNICK,

supra note 56, at 133 ("[B]ecause the maintenance of the information system is
perceived by the prosecutor as necessary to law enforcement, the needs of this
system tend to be given extra consideration by the prosecutor.").
278. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
279. See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
280. See Satterfield v. State, 546 S.E.2d 859, 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001);
Boyington v. State, 389 So. 2d 485, 488 (Miss. 1980); Sanders v. State, 846 So.
2d 230, 236-27 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
281. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 632 (2002) (weighing, in
determining whether prosecutors must disclose impeachment evidence to
defendants prior to plea bargaining, whether such a requirement would
"deprive[e] the plea-bargaining process of its main resource-saving
advantages"); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (recognizing the
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or remedies for constitutional violations, such as the
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.2 2 Thus, a robust argument for the application
of the Thirteenth Amendment in the informant context
requires a response to likely law enforcement concerns.
First and foremost, the Thirteenth Amendment leaves
police and prosecutors with options other than threatening
criminal prosecution: they may encourage cooperation with
inducements other than leniency, offer leniency in exchange
for the provision of previously-obtained information, or
compel active cooperation from convicts. 83 All of these
alternatives are subject to criticism, however, because they
are potentially less efficient or efficacious ways of obtaining
cooperation than threatening a potential informant with
prison time.2 u Moreover, an informant who only provides
previously obtained information is less useful, because the
police cannot use the informant to investigate specific
individuals or crimes, and to obtain physical evidence that
can be used to secure a conviction or convince another
defendant to cooperate. Finally, a convicted criminal will be
an ineffective active informant unless the informant's
conviction and the terms of her sentence can be protected
from public disclosure; otherwise, the informant would easily
be discovered, criminals would refuse to interact with her,
and she may be in physical danger.2 5
importance of plea bargains to the criminal justice system in course of deciding
whether prosecutor's decision to seek indictment on more severe charges in
retaliation for defendant's decision to decline plea bargain violated the due
process clause).
282. See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1846-47 (2009) (weighing
the harm of excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment to
the truth-seeking function of trial against any benefits of deterrence).
283. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
284. WILSON, supra note 49, at 66. For instance, an informant motivated by
a sense of civic duty may decide at some point that she has fulfilled her
obligation to society or that cooperating with the police has become too risky. If
that happens, the police at most can offer money or appeal to a sense of guilt.
Though these maneuvers may work, the state's persuasive arsenal is much
more robust when it can threaten prison time. See id. at 66-67 (discussing the
different experiences and philosophies of two DEA agents in trying to develop
useful long-term informants).
285. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 48, at 72 ("Secrecy, of course, is of
paramount consideration in the continuing effective use of a person who is
furnishing information. If we are careless we frustrate our first objective in
obtaining evidence."); Pecquet & Corbett, supra note 8 (quoting TPD spokesman
explaining why the TPD did not take Hoffman to jail or inform the local
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In large part, these concerns only underscore why the use
of coerced informants violates the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Amendment prohibits using the threat of criminal
sanctions to compel labor precisely because the threat is so
powerful that it prevents the laborer from choosing not to
86
work or from rejecting oppressive or dangerous conditions.
Thus, when police direct a coerced informant's investigation,
they can involve an informant like Rachel Hoffman in more
dangerous criminal activity than the informant has the
training or ability to handle, and the informant cannot
refuse.2" 7 It is this lack of a real choice that renders the
condition of servitude offensive to a free society.28 8
The safety and efficacy concerns that require that an
informant's identity be kept secret are different, however,
because they are independent of the underlying rationale for
the Thirteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, the interests that
counsel in favor of secrecy are counterbalanced by
constitutional arguments in favor of requiring that criminal
records remain public.25 9 While the ultimate resolution of
these opposing concerns is beyond the scope of this article,
experience shows that it is impracticable to protect the
identity of convicts who become active informants. The
Federal Judicial Conference recommends that access to
sealed documents, such as plea agreements involving
cooperation, be prohibited. 2 0 Additionally, informant plea

prosecutor, "If we take her to jail, people are more likely to find out about it ....
It's an effort to maintain the integrity of the investigation.").
286. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
287. See Presentment, supra note 1, 1 1 ("Although Ms. Hoffman had a well
established business of cannabis distribution with her friends, she had no
experience with dealing in ecstacy [sic], cocaine or firearms.").
288. By analogy, an argument against applying the Thirteenth Amendment
to coerced informants on these efficacy grounds is no more convincing than a
landowner defending her decision to threaten to beat a laborer on the basis that
it is the best way to get him to work hard.
289. See Raleigh Hannah Levine, Towards a New Public Access Doctrine, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2006) (outlining current Supreme Court precedent and
lower court decisions on First Amendment right to access to proceedings in
criminal cases); Meliah Thomas, The FirstAmendment Right of Access to Docket
Sheets, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1537 (2006) (discussing constitutionality of formal and
informal practices of concealing the existence of certain criminal cases).
290. See Judicial Conference Policy on Privacy and Public Access to
Electronic Case Files, March 2008, httpJ/www.privacy.uscourts.gov/
privacypolicyMar2008Revised.htm (prohibiting access to sealed documents,
including "plea agreements indicating cooperation").
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agreements and sentencing records are routinely sealed to
protect informants and policing efforts.291
B. Defense Concerns
Criticism by those on the defense side of the aisle is likely
to involve two issues: first, that forbidding cooperation in
exchange for leniency interferes with a defendant's autonomy;
and second, that forbidding the use of coerced informants will
result in defendants receiving more prison time. The first
concern is merely a reiteration of the argument that an
individual's agreement to become a coerced informant
exempts the arrangement from the Thirteenth Amendment
scrutiny, but from a defense perspective.
As explained
previously, the Thirteenth Amendment cannot be waived by
an individual because it protects societal interests in addition
to individual rights, and thus the use of coerced informants
cannot be defended on the ground that informants themselves
have a right to choose to enter into a condition of involuntary
servitude.2 92 Second, forbidding the use of coerced informants
is likely to result in at least a temporary lengthening of
sentences and increased rate of incarceration. It is unlikely,
given the importance of informants to law enforcement, that a
more formalized process that involves conviction, sentencing,
and a motion for leniency will prevent those with the most to
offer from negotiating arrangements with police and
prosecutors. But individuals who have less to offer will not
receive leniency and will be subject to prosecution and
punishment for their crimes. For the reasons explained infra,
the more accurate correlation between the committed and the
sentences received that would result would be a net positive
from a larger societal standpoint.293
Additionally, forcing negotiations between defendants
and the state to take place in the context of a formal
proceeding will put defense counsel in a position to better
protect their clients' interests.
First, many coerced
informants agree to cooperate with the police or prosecutors
without the advice of counsel, who could explain to their
291. See MARX, supra note 104, at 49 (recounting that in early 1980s, at least
seventy-five defendants were permitted to enter secret guilty pleas in order to
shield their undercover work); Natapoff, supra note 105, at 1000-01.
292. See supra notes 229-41 and accompanying text.
293. See infra Part VI.
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clients the charges at issue, the sentences that they might
receive, and their chances of success at trial.2 94 A prohibition
on agreements that exchange leniency for active cooperation
prior to a conviction will guarantee that the informant will
have access to counsel, thus allowing informants to negotiate
a fairer arrangement based on their actual criminal liability
and a realistic assessment of the sentence they would likely
receive.
Moreover, the participation of defense counsel and the
involvement of the court can guarantee that the obligations of
both the informant and the government are clearly defined,
set forth in their entirety, and enforceable. 295 Also, because
any agreement will most likely be folded into a plea bargain,
the defendant will be entitled to the procedural protections
that attach thereto, including a colloquy with the judge to
ensure that the defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. 296 Finally, these procedural protections and the
involvement of counsel will minimize the risk that the police
will be able to coerce an innocent individual into becoming an
active informant through unsubstantiated threats of criminal

charges. 297
VI. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN A LARGER POLICY
CONTEXT

Thus far, this article has argued that recognizing a
Thirteenth Amendment prohibition on the use of coerced
informants is justified on doctrinal, historical, and practical
grounds. The final prong of the argument is that using the

294. See Natapoff, supra note 11, at 667-68.
295. See id. at 665-66 (discussing the lack of finality, completeness, and
enforceability inherent in current cooperation agreements).
296. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
297. While there are no reported cases of the police compelling an innocent
civilian to act as a coerced informant through the use of false threats, the
pressure placed on police to develop informant networks, see MALLORY, supra
note 11, at 18 ("When examining productive investigator methods, it becomes
obvious that investigators who have numerous informants are the most effective
and efficient."), coupled with the encouragement that they receive to use bluffs
to recruit informants, see id. at 23, suggests that such situations are inevitable.
Of course, just as it is commonly accepted that some innocent defendants plead
guilty despite the procedural protections available, see Scott W. Howe, The
Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 629-32 (2005), these
protections are not likely to prevent all cases where an active informant agrees
to assist police in exchange for leniency on charges of which she is innocent.
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Thirteenth Amendment to regulate the relationship between
the government and informants also will ameliorate some of
the policy concerns that others have raised about the use of
informants. Though these policy benefits are not sufficient
alone to justify this application of the Thirteenth
Amendment, an examination of the larger policy context
shows that the Thirteenth Amendment can play an important
role in addressing problems that are currently wanting for an
effective solution.
Social science scholars have long discussed the corrosive
effects of the infiltration of social groups by informants,
particularly in the historical context of the Stasi, well known
for their prolific use of informants in East German society.2 98
They have also looked at the sociological context of agents
provocateur, informants who incite wrongdoing among fringe
social and political groups. 299 Recently, legal academicians,
led by Professor Natapoff, have also begun looking at the
impact that widespread informant use in our criminal justice
system has had on communities in which crime and snitching
are most prevalent.
Professor Natapoff postulates that the use of informants
both exacerbates existing social problems in crime-ridden
communities and creates a number of new ones. First, when
police tolerate relatively minor criminal activity by low-level
informants under the utilitarian justification that they assist
the police in apprehending "bigger fish," marginal
communities are made even more dangerous for their lawabiding residents.3 °0 Second, Natapoff argues that, much like
the East German government's pervasive surveillance of its
citizens, the widespread use of informants in already crimeridden communities threatens to "ero[del the social fabric" of
those communities.30 ' Interpersonal relationships between
298. See BARBARA MILLER, NARRATIvES OF GUILT AND COMPLIANCE IN
UNIFIED GERMANY: STASI INFORMERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON SOCIETY (1999).

299. See Greer, supra note 52, at 515-18; Gary T. Marx, Thoughts on a
Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant:The Agent Provocateurand
the Informant, 80 AM. J. SOC. 402, 428-30 (1974) (discussing the diverse impact
that agents provocateur can have, including increased radicalization and
deflation).
300. Natapoff, supra note 11, at 687-89; see also Alexandra Natapoff,
Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1748-52 (2006) (discussing the
consequences of the under-enforcement of criminal laws in certain
communities).
301. Natapoff, supra note 11, at 691-92.
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citizens are infused with mistrust, and individuals can suffer
psychological harm. 2
Third, government tolerance of
informant criminality undermines the normative messages of
the criminal justice system, communicating that criminal
liability is not based on a moral judgment of an individual's
actions, but only on a utilitarian determination of the value of
the individual to the state.3 °3 This expressive confusion
damages the credibility of the police, who are no longer seen
as moral agents interested in justice, and interferes with the
relationship between the police and community members. 0 4
Finally, Professor Natapoff contends that widespread
deployment of informants, most of whom are criminals, in
poor, urban neighborhoods, identifies those neighborhoods as
unavoidably criminalized, thus dooming to failure any
attempts at self-improvement.305

Professor Natapoff suggests a patchwork of solutions to
these problems, including increased transparency and
accountability in the use of informants, restrictions on the
leniency available to informants, open public debate on the
use of informants, and research into the impact of informants
on high crime communities.3 0 6

Additionally, she proposes

that courts should permit discovery on the use of informants
in individual cases and hold hearings on the reliability of
informant testimony, as well as the publication of informant
data and democratic debate on the desirability of using
informants.0 7 While these are laudable proposals, they are
admittedly indirect solutions to the identified problems. 38
Albeit somewhat coincidentally, recognizing Thirteenth
Amendment limitations on the use of informants would
provide significant and direct assistance in addressing the
policy concerns identified by Professor Natapoff. The main
practical impact of prohibiting police and prosecutors from
exchanging leniency for active cooperation, absent a
conviction, will be a decline in the number of criminals
released back into high-crime communities without
302. Id.
303. Id. at 694-95.
304. Id.; Natapoff, supra note 300, at 1750.
305. Natapoff, supra note 11, at 695-96.
306. See id. at 699-703.
307. Id.
308. See id. at 696-98 (recognizing the difficulties in imposing significant
direct restrictions on informant use).
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punishment.
Currently, most individuals who become
coerced informants presumably do not already possess
information of sufficient value to justify the state foregoing
prosecution.3 0 9 Thus, if these individuals can no longer offer
assistance in exchange for leniency, they will have little
leverage in negotiations with police or prosecutors. Those
civilians who are best-situated to become useful informants
might be able to negotiate plea agreements that include
active cooperation as part of the sentence, 310 but in the
remaining cases the state will be forced to assess each as they
would any other suspected criminal and make a prosecution
decision based on typical discretionary considerations. 1
Returning fewer criminals to their communities
apparently untouched by law enforcement will rejuvenate the
value of the criminal law as an expressive, normative, and
deterrent force. Individuals contemplating criminal activity
will see that the likelihood of punishment is greater because
"working off' a charge will no longer be a viable option, and
thus will be deterred from involvement in crime. 1 2 Moreover,
law-abiding citizens who currently view the police as driven
purely by institutional interests will see law enforcement as
more community-focused and thus deserving of greater
respect. The decision-making in the criminal justice system
will also appear to be motivated less by a utilitarian
assessment of an individual criminal's value as an informant
and more by a retributive assessment of the moral desert of
the individual's criminal actions. Additionally, including
309. It is hard to imagine that a civilian possessing such information would
choose to become a coerced informant rather than turn over the information.
Though the dangers of being discovered as a snitch are significant, particularly
if the civilian is required to testify at trial, they would seem to pale in
comparison to the dangers faced by an informant who immerses herself in
criminal activity in order to obtain new evidence.
310. See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
311. While the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is itself a much criticized
aspect of the criminal justice system, see, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American
Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV.
393 (2001), an increased normalization in the treatment of arrestees would be
an improvement over the current system.
312. Recent studies suggest that the probability of punishment is a more
important component of deterrence than its severity. Edward K. Cheng,
StructuralLaws and the Puzzle of RegulatingBehavior, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 655,
660 (2006). If this is true, the systematic and widespread failure to punish
informants may have an even greater impact on the criminality of others than
might originally have been expected.
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work as an active informant as part of a criminal's sentence
will make clear that this service is difficult, dangerous,
punitive, and not merely a free pass for continuing
criminality.
Ultimately, effecting these changes in the
communicative nature of law enforcement will make the lawabiding members of high-crime communities more likely to
cooperate with the police in fighting crime. And with fewer
criminals permitted to roam the streets unchecked, these
citizens can undertake the difficult work of rebuilding their
community with less interference from its deleterious
members.
Just as the decline in active informants means that fewer
criminals will be released back into high-crime communities,
it also means that fewer community members will actively
seek to "make cases" against their neighbors in order to avoid
criminal sanctions. Though active informants rarely seek out
crime aggressively enough to satisfy the strict legal definition
of entrapment, 13 they nonetheless encourage criminal
activity that may not have occurred otherwise.3 1 4 Fewer
active informants thus will mean less crime, thereby creating
safer communities and lessening the appearance of collusion
between police and criminals. Additionally, as fewer civilians
seek to obtain incriminating evidence against their neighbors,
law-abiding members of communities will have less reason to
doubt the motives of others within the community, thus
enhancing trust and permitting stronger internal communal
bonds.
As these communities become stronger, their
members will become more effective partners with law
enforcement and become better able to eliminate criminal
elements in their midst.
Of course, the Thirteenth Amendment is not a panacea
for the problems arising from widespread informant use. The
Amendment's goal is the protection of individual rights and
the eradication of a narrow range of onerous social practices,

313. But see United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
sufficient evidence in the record to support entrapment defense where
defendant only set up deal after an informant called her every day for a month
requesting that she sell marijuana to undercover officer and began threatening
her and acting belligerently); People v. Bonner, 895 N.E.2d 99, 103-07 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008) (finding entrapment established as a matter of law where defendant
agreed to sell drugs only after informant offered him sexual favors to do so).
314. MARX, supra note 104, at 153-54.
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rather than reform of the criminal justice

system.315

Therefore, some potentially deleterious informant use may
still remain. For instance, some criminals will still be
released back into their communities and their past crimes
thereby tolerated, in exchange for previously-obtained
information. 316 As a result, the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition on the use of coerced informants should be seen as
a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, the types of
structural reforms suggested by Professor Natapoff and
others.3 17
CONCLUSION
Rachel Hoffman's death is a terrible tragedy marked by a
significant human toll: the loss of one life, the likely death of
two others in prison or at the hands of the state, 318 and the
potential end of at least one law enforcement career. 1 9
Despite these losses, this tragedy provides an opportunity to
reexamine the constitutional implications of the relationship
between the state and informants who, like Rachel Hoffman,
work under threat of criminal punishment. As a doctrinal
matter, this article argues that the use of criminal sanctions
to compel service from a civilian falls squarely within the
Supreme Court's definition of involuntary servitude and thus
runs afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment. But because of the
unique historical foundations of the Thirteenth Amendment,
more than a mere doctrinal argument is needed to justify
applying the Amendment in this novel context.
Using the Thirteenth Amendment to protect coerced
informants appears at first blush to be a significant departure
from the Amendment's immediate aim of eradicating African
315. See supra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
316. Such under-enforcement does not necessarily have a negative impact,
however, as the trading of leniency on a minor offense for information about a
more serious crime can actually engender trust in a crime-ridden community,
thus leading to more effective law enforcement in the future. See Natapoff,
supra note 300, at 1751-52.
317. See Natapoff, supra note 11, at 697 n.230 (describing other proposals for
reform of informant use).
318. Nic Corbett, State Attorney's Office Seeking Death Penalty in Rachel
Hoffman

Case,
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slavery, peonage, and similar institutions. Such a departure
triggers the concerns raised by scholars that the unfettered
use of the Thirteenth Amendment in novel arenas can lead to
unintended consequences, vague legal standards, and an
eventual weakening of a totemic constitutional statement.2 °
This article seeks to allay those concerns first by recognizing
that at its core the coerced informant's situation is the same
as the peon's.
Both are forced to labor in dangerous
conditions for little or no pay with the full weight of the
criminal justice system guaranteeing their continued service.
And just as critically, the differences in their predicamentsnamely, the informant's putatively voluntary agreement to
cooperate and the fact that the criminal charges threatened
against the informant are independent of any failure to
cooperate-are not of constitutional significance. Finally, the
application of the Thirteenth Amendment suggested herein is
narrow: it forbids only the use of threats of criminal sanctions
as leverage to compel informant cooperation absent a
For these reasons, the use of the
criminal conviction.
Amendment to protect coerced informants, while novel,
strengthens the Amendment's prohibition by recognizing that
the Constitution forbids involuntary servitude even when the
servant is a suspected criminal.
Merely recognizing that the Thirteenth Amendment
applies to the use of coerced informants does not resolve the
If the
issue of what remedy the Amendment requires.
Thirteenth Amendment is conceived of as prohibiting a class
of conditions that are problematic only because of their
deleterious effects on those subjected to them, then the
negative impact of a violation of the Amendment may be
remedied by safeguards that ameliorate those effects. In the
case of coerced informants, such a practical approach would
For instance, the
allow a range of possible solutions.
government could be required to normalize the informant
recruitment process by allowing civilians to consult with
counsel prior to entering into cooperation agreements,
providing better training for informants, or concretely
spelling out an informant's obligations. Similarly, limits can
be placed on who could be recruited as an informant,
forbidding police from requiring cooperation from minors or
320. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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nonviolent offenders. 32 1

Such practical measures, however, which address only
the unjust incidental effects of a condition of involuntary
servitude, fail to achieve the expansive goals that animate the
Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment is nearly unique
among constitutional protections in that it does more than
protect individual rights-it vindicates broader societal
concerns over the fundamental incompatibility of slavery and
involuntary servitude with American ideals of freedom.
Recognizing the primacy of these interests in the Thirteenth
Amendment analysis, this article views the Amendment
consistently with its forceful language as an absolute
prohibition on a class of conditions that are per se sufficiently
harmful to require the termination of the offending condition,
an absolute remedy. Applied in the instant context, this
approach instructs us that because the use of coerced
informants violates the Thirteenth Amendment, halfmeasures are inadequate to remedy the constitutional
violation and that use must cease.

321. It is these sorts of reforms that Rachel Hoffman's parents sought, and
largely failed, to have enacted by the Florida legislature. See Leary, supra note
19.

